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Abstract
This paper presents a model of the joint venture that is grounded in the stylized
facts we found from a sample of 200 joint venture contracts. The model incor-
porates the revenue-sharing contract into the incomplete contract frameworks of
Grossman-Hart-Moore Property Rights Theory and the Transaction Cost Theory
of the ﬁrm, and emphasizes the impact of expropriation. Joint control can be opti-
mal as well as unilateral control. Our econometric analysis of the revenue-sharing
and control arrangements oﬀers strong support to our Property-Rights-Theory mo-
tivated model with self investment but rejects that with cooperative investment.
The Transaction-Cost-Theory motivated model leaves some important empirical
ﬁndings unexplained. Our ﬁndings also reject some of the existing theories of joint
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The joint venture is an increasingly popular form of organization. In China, the second
largest recipient of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) in the world after the United
States, 183,015 among 304,821 approved FDI projects between 1979 and 1997 were equity
joint ventures; in the same period, 51% of the total value of FDI was invested in equity
joint ventures (according to the statistics provided by China’s Ministry of Foreign Trade
and Economic Cooperation or MOFTEC). Despite its importance in the real world,
the joint venture has not received as much attention as it should from economists. In
particular, no work has been done to systematically document and explain the revenue
sharing and control arrangements in joint ventures. Such work is important not only
for understanding the joint venture but also for testing the empirical relevance of some
theories of the ﬁrm. This paper attempts to ﬁll this void.
Our empirical work is based on a unique sample of 200 joint venture contracts. For
each joint venture, we have information about the assignment of tasks among joint
venture partners, the distribution of revenue shares and voting shares, and the decision
making rules for a number of decisions. A few stylized facts stand out. First, the
partners in a joint venture are assigned diﬀerent tasks. Second, both revenue-sharing
and control arrangements ﬁgure prominently in the joint venture contracts. Third,
control arrangements are made for a number of issues in each joint venture; some issues
are under joint control by both partners and others are under unilateral control by one
partner. Finally, revenue sharing and control arrangements vary across ﬁrms.
These ﬁndings suggest that a joint venture is a production team in which its partners
play complementary roles. Three strands of the literature are particularly relevant to
the understanding of such team production. The ﬁrst one emphasizes the importance of
revenue sharing contracts for solving the moral hazard problem (for example, Holmstrom,
1982). The other two, the Transaction Cost Theory (TCT) of the ﬁrm (Williamson,
1975, 1979, 1985; Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978) and the Property Rights Theory
(PRT) of the ﬁrm (GHM: Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995),
both consider control rights in the context of incomplete contracting, but with diﬀerent
focuses. The TCT approach focuses on the implication of control rights on transaction
costs while the PRT approach focuses on the implication of ownership arrangements
1on the distortion to ex ante investment incentives. All three strands of literature oﬀer
important insights but each is incomplete for the understanding of the joint venture.
Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst literature does not address control issues, while the latter two
are silent on revenue sharing. Furthermore, the Property Rights Theory focuses on
ownership as the only control arrangement. In light of the empirical ﬁndings in the
last paragraph, for a model to describe joint ventures, it needs to consider both revenue
sharing and control arrangements, and their possible interaction, in the context of team
production; it should also consider control arrangements beyond ownership; and ﬁnally
it should predict joint control in some cases and unilateral control in others.1
Building on aforementioned strands of literature, we present a theoretical model with
a few alternative speciﬁcations to describe joint ventures. Under the main speciﬁcation,
two partners start with a production plan, a revenue sharing contract, and the gover-
nance rule over a decision (not necessarily about the access to an asset). Then they each
make some investment, which will aﬀect their private beneﬁts and a veriﬁable revenue
that is to be shared between them. The initial plan is incomplete in that it is not fully
contingent. Therefore, after the investment is made, there may be opportunities for
the partners to adjust the initial production plan to respond to the changing market
condition. The adjustment may be used to beneﬁt both partners at least weakly, and it
may also be abused to beneﬁt one partner at the expense of the other, relative to their
payoﬀs under the initial plan. We call the former type a Pareto-improving action and
the latter a value-redistributing action. The two partners bargain over the adjustment
decision, possibly with side payments. However, in the case of bargaining failure, the
controlling partner adjusts the plan to maximize his payoﬀ if the governance rule is uni-
lateral control, and no adjustment is made to the plan if the rule gives the two partners
joint control. We study the optimal revenue sharing and control arrangements in this
model.
The value-redistributing action discussed above corresponds to what is often called
expropriation of minority shareholders by majority shareholders. Recent research by
Claessens et al. (1999) and La Porta et al. (2000) reveals that such expropriation is
1To the extent that our model considers both revenue sharing and control arrangements, it is related
to Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Dewatripont and Tirole (1994). These papers address the relationship
between an investor and an entrepreneur while our model studies the relationship between two partners
in team production.
2an important problem in publicly traded ﬁrms, perhaps more so than the conﬂict of
interest between owners and managers. In closely held ﬁrms, oppression or squeeze-out
of minority shareholders by majority shareholders is even worse due to the lack of legal
and market protection for minority shareholders (see O’Neal, 1987, and O’Neal and
Thompson, 1995).2
Under unilateral control, the ineﬃcient value-redistributing action may or may not
be taken without renegotiation, depending on the controlling partner’s revenue share as
the action reduces the amount of revenue to be shared. Under joint control, the Pareto-
improving action will not be taken without renegotiation. The revenue sharing and
control arrangements thus aﬀect the partners’ payoﬀs and consequently their investment
incentives, even if renegotiation is possible because they aﬀect the disagreement payoﬀs
in the bargaining. An important determinant of the optimal control arrangements is the
relative strength of the Pareto-improving action and the value-redistributing action.
There are two types of initial investment. The ﬁrst type, self investment, increases
the investor’s own private beneﬁt but has no eﬀect on the other partner’s. The second
type, cooperative investment, has no eﬀect on the investor’s own private beneﬁtb u t
has a positive eﬀect on the other partner’s. The optimal control arrangement and the
way the revenue sharing arrangement interacts with the control arrangement depend on
the type of investment. We also consider two extreme assumptions about bargaining
eﬃciency.
The model under the main speciﬁcation incorporates the revenue sharing contract
into the PRT of the ﬁrm. To facilitate comparison, we also do the same to the TCT.
We accomplish this by eliminating the investment stage from the model. To highlight
the cost of bargaining toward eﬃcient decision, we also assume that bargaining cannot
succeed in bringing the partners out of their disagreement position. The remainder of
the main speciﬁcation is maintained.
Given the plurality of assumptions and their corresponding implications, more em-
pirical analysis is useful in addition to those ﬁndings reported earlier. The analysis can
potentially help us compare the empirical relevance of alternative assumptions and deter-
2By relying on the principle of majority control and/or the business judgment rule, American courts
have been reluctant to interfere in the internal aﬀairs of closely held ﬁrms. In addition, the lack of an
eﬃcient and developed market for interests in closely held ﬁrms diminishes the informativeness of share
prices. This makes it diﬃcult for future investors to infer whether the controlling shareholders have
engaged in expropriation, thereby weakening the reputation concerns of the controlling shareholders.
3mine whether the predictions of our model under some given speciﬁcation are consistent
with the empirical evidence. This would shed light on the empirical relevance of the
existing theories on which our model is built and of various extensions of the theories.
It would also help us assess the empirical relevance of some of the existing models of
the joint venture. Section 6 presents our econometric analysis of the revenue sharing
and control arrangements, and discusses the implication of the empirical ﬁndings on our
theory and some other theories.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some basic facts
about joint ventures that we found from our sample. Section 3 sets up our theoretical
model, which is analyzed under the main assumptions in Section 4 and under alternative
assumptions in Section 5. After the empirical analysis, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Some Basic Facts about Joint Ventures
This section presents some basic ﬁndings about revenue-sharing and control arrange-
ments in equity joint ventures from a unique data set. The data set resulted from a
series of eﬀorts made between 1997 and 1998. We started with a pilot sample of 20
international joint-venture contracts in China.3 After studying these 20 contracts, we
designed a questionnaire, which was then used to extract key contract clauses of 200
joint-venture contracts with the help of China’s Ministry of Foreign Trade and Eco-
nomic Cooperation.
2.1 Descriptive statistics
The contracts in the data set were signed in the period 1986-1996, with 66% of them
concentrated in 1993-1994 (see Figure 1). The mean of registered capital is US$12 mil-
3To set up a joint venture, all parties must ﬁrst reach an agreement on the project and sign a contract
delineating each and every party’s contributions to the proposed venture. This joint-venture contract
speciﬁes the equity-sharing arrangement and the composition of the board of directors. All parties must
also agree on articles of association that specify the governance structure of the joint venture, including
the rights and voting rules of the board of directors. Hence, the term joint-venture contract in this
paper refers to these two legal documents. For description of procedures for forming a joint venture in
China, see Rosen (1999).
4lion. Of the 200 joint ventures, 92.5% have one (156) or two (29) Chinese partners, and
97.5% involve one (172 joint ventures) or two (23) foreign partners (see Tables 1a-1b).
As in the overall population of joint ventures established in this period (China Statis-
tical Yearbook, various years), the majority of the foreign partners in our sample are
from Hong Kong (94), United States (39), and Japan (31); see Tables 2a for details.
Chinese partners are from all provinces except six economically backward ones (Jiangxi,
Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Qinghai, and Ningxia). Not surprisingly, the Chinese partners
are heavily concentrated in the more economically developed regions such as Beijing
(122), Shanghai (26), Jiangsu (21), and Guangdong (21); see Table 2b for details. Con-
sequently, 68.5% of the 200 joint ventures are physically located in these four regions
(Table 2c).
Table 3a lists the range of businesses involved by the 200 joint ventures. Represented
are all SIC single-digit businesses except A (Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing), B (Min-
ing), J (Public Administration), and K (unclassiﬁable Establishments). In addition, 18
out of 20 two-digit manufacturing industries are covered; and the two left out are to-
bacco products (SIC code 21), and petroleum and coal products (SIC code 29), which
have been heavily protected industries in China due to their proﬁtability or importance
to the general economy (Table 3b).4 The distribution of the 55 joint ventures in the
category of services at the two-digit SIC level is shown in Table 3c. Overall, we have a
rather balanced and representative sample of joint ventures.
2.2 Revenue-sharing and control arrangements
The joint venture has been argued as a means to utilize complementary skills of diﬀerent
corporations. Figure 2 depicts the pattern of task assignment to joint-venture partners
in our sample. There is strong evidence of task specialization between the Chinese and
foreign partners. The Chinese partners are typically assigned to help the joint ventures
secure business license, hire local employees, procure local inputs and arrange supply
of utilities, whereas the foreign partners are asked to contribute intellectual property,
4There are three joint ventures each covering 2 two-digit manufacturing industries (the ﬁrst one has
SIC codes 22 and 23; the second one has SIC codes 30 and 31; and the third one gets codes 36 and 38).
5procure inputs from overseas market, provide staﬀ training, and assist export. The
observed pattern of task specialization reﬂects the comparative advantages of Chinese
and foreign ﬁrms.
Figure 3 reveals the distribution of the foreign partner’s equity share in our sample.5
To the contrary of common perceptions, there is no upper limit on foreign ownership in
China except for selected industries. However, there is a de facto lower limit on foreign
ownership, as joint ventures with a minimum of 25% foreign ownership are entitled to
preferential treatment with respect to corporate income tax (Rosen, 1999). This explains
why there are 18 joint ventures (9% of the sample) in which the foreign partners hold
25% equity shares. It is also interesting to note that there are 43 joint ventures (21.5%
of the sample) in which the foreign partners and Chinese partners each hold 50% equity
shares; such joint ventures are also called 50-50 joint ventures.
The highest decision-making body in a joint venture is the board of directors.T h e
joint-venture partners can nominate candidates to sit on the board and represent their
interests. We ﬁnd that the number of board members nominated by the foreign partner
in a joint venture is generally proportional to its equity shares. The correlation between
the equity share of the foreign partner and its voting share (deﬁned as the percentage
of board members nominated by the foreign partner) is 77.68%. As shown in Table 4,
in 131 out of 157 non 50-50 joint ventures,6 the majority partner has more than 50%
representation on the board of directors. Of the forty-three 50-50 joint ventures, 28
involve equal board representation by the Chinese and foreign partners.
However, exercise of control rights in a joint venture depends on the voting rules
as well as the board representation. We ﬁnd that voting rules are speciﬁed in the
joint venture contracts for some ﬁfteen important decisions: (1) changing the corporate
charter, (2) terminating or dissolving the joint venture, (3) increasing or transferring reg-
istered capital, (4) merging with other organizations, (5) approving important reports
from management, (6) approving the budget and proﬁt/loss allocation, (7) approving
important joint venture regulations, (8) approving external borrowing, (9) hiring consul-
tants, (10) designing employment contracts, (11) establishing/closing subsidiaries, (12)
5If two or more foreign partners are involved in a joint venture, their equity shares are added up.
6That is, either the Chinese partner or the foreign partner holds more than 50% equity shares.
6hiring/ﬁring CEO and other senior management staﬀ, (13) liquidating assets upon com-
pletion or termination of the joint venture, (14) disposing other important assets, and
(15) making other important decisions that should be made by the board. Furthermore,
diﬀerent voting rules, ranging from simple majority voting, two-thirds majority voting
to unanimous voting, are stipulated for diﬀerent decisions within each joint venture. As
shown in Figure 4, unanimous voting is almost universally required for change of the
corporate charter (191 out of 200 joint ventures), termination or dissolution of the ven-
ture (188), merger with other organizations (188), and increase or transfer of registered
capital (187). Two-thirds majority voting is heavily used for approval of important re-
ports from management (70 out of 200 joint ventures), and approval of the budget and
proﬁt/loss allocation (70). It shou l db en o t e d ,h o w e v e r ,t h a ts i m p l em a j o r i t yv o t i n gr u l e
is not the most commonly speciﬁed rule for any of the ﬁfteen important decisions. Mean-
while, in some joint ventures, no voting rule is speciﬁed for some of the ﬁfteen decisions
such as hiring consultants (192 out of 200 joint ventures) and designing employment
contracts (158 out of 200 joint ventures). We believe that simple majority voting is the
default voting rule, which explains the above two observations.
Of the ﬁfteen decisions listed above, CEO appointment receives special attention in
joint venture contracts. There is a separate section on how the CEO is chosen in every
joint venture contract in our sample. Speciﬁcally, 38 out of 200 joint venture contracts
simply say that the board of directors decides on the CEO appointment; 66 contracts
specify that the Chinese partner nominates a CEO candidate for board approval; 83
contracts specify that the foreign partner nominates a CEO candidate for board approval;
and most interestingly, 13 contracts stipulate that the Chinese and foreign partners
jointly nominate a CEO candidate for board approval.
Given the board composition of a joint venture, the control arrangements of the
above-mentioned decisions except that of CEO appointment (i.e., decision #12) can
be determined based on the speciﬁc voting rules adopted.7 Joint control is said to be
in place, (a) when a decision requires simple majority voting but one of the partners
(Chinese or foreign) has a board representation of exactly 1/2, (b) when a decision
7Simple majority voting rule is assumed for any decision the voting rule of which is not speciﬁed in
the contract.
7requires two-thirds majority voting but one of the partners (Chinese or foreign) has a
board representation between 1/3 and 2/3, and (c) when the decision requires unanimous
voting. Under each of the above three circumstances, neither the Chinese partner nor
the foreign partner can make the decision without the other partner’s consent.
For the control arrangement of CEO appointment, we consider the speciﬁcC E O
nomination process in addition to the comparison of voting rule vis-a-vis board compo-
sition discussed in the above paragraph. If one partner controls the CEO nomination
but the other partner has unilateral control in the board, then joint control is said to be
in place. If both partners need to agree upon the CEO nomination, then joint control
is in place irrespective of who controls the board.
Overall we ﬁnd that there is a high degree of joint control for all ﬁfteen decisions
(Figure 5). Even the lowest degree of joint control among the decisions, 48 out of 200
joint ventures for the decision of hiring consultants, is quite signiﬁcant. For the decision
of CEO appointment, joint control is in place for 130 out of 200 joint ventures. The
degree of joint control is over 95% for decisions on change of the corporate charter,
termination or dissolution of the venture, increase or transfer of registered capital, and
merger with other organizations. These results also indicate that the degree of joint
control versus unilateral control varies from one decision to another within each joint
venture.
Conventional wisdom has that joint control is more likely in 50-50 joint ventures
as compared with other joint ventures. To test this conjecture, we split our sample
into two: one for 157 non 50-50 joint ventures, and the other for forty-three 50-50 joint
ventures. We ﬁnd that the degree of joint control is indeed much higher in the 50-50 joint
ventures than in the non 50-50 joint ventures though there is little diﬀerence in terms
of voting rules (see Figures 4a-b and 5a-b on voting rules and control arrangements,
respectively). Even for the non 50-50 joint ventures, however, the degree of joint control
is still signiﬁcant for most of the ﬁfteen decisions.
In summary, our main ﬁndings about joint ventures include: (1) Partners play com-
plementary roles. (2) The revenue sharing rules vary across ﬁrms. (3) The revenue
shares and the voting shares of the partners are highly positively correlated. (4) Rules
are set for the making of many decisions and the rules vary across decisions. (5) Joint
8control is prevalent.
3 A Theoretical Framework
In this section, we present a theoretical model that is motivated by the empirical ﬁndings
reported in the last section.
3.1 Model primitives
We consider a joint project between two partners, henceforth called A and B. To ensure
the joint project to be successful, the two partners come up with a detailed production
plan about the quality and quantity of the goods or services to be produced and the mode
of production. Following the existing literature on incomplete contracts, we assume that
it is impossible to write a fully contingent production plan before the partners start to
work on the project. Therefore, after the market condition is realized, the production
plan written ex ante can be found to be ineﬃcient for the given market condition and
it should be modiﬁed. Then, it is important for the partners to specify rules (or control
arrangements) according to which the ex ante production plan will be modiﬁed.
With the above considerations, the sequence of events is assumed as follows. At date
0, the two partners negotiate to settle on a production plan and rules for modifying the
plan. They also sign a revenue-sharing contract. At date 1, A and B choose eﬀorts,
denoted by α and β, respectively. For ease of exposition, we also call a partner’s eﬀort
his investment in the joint project.8 At date 3, a decision is made about whether or not
and, if yes, how to modify the ex ante contracted production plan, and the gains from
trade are realized. We denote the decision by δ and normalize the ex ante contracted
production plan to be δ =0 .A td a t e2 — after the investments but before decision δ is
made — the two partners may bargain over δ.
The joint project produces a veriﬁable revenue R. In addition, each partner derives
some private beneﬁt Pj (where j = A, B) from the joint project that is not contractible.
8In Section 5.4, we will consider an alternative model where no investment is made at date 1.
9We assume that
R = r(δ)y(α,β),
PA = a(δ)yA(α,β),
PB = b(δ)yB(α,β),
where y is increasing and concave in (α,β), while yA and yB are non-decreasing and
concave (possibly weakly) in (α,β). For simplicity of analysis, α and β are normalized
to be the investment costs.
The investment of a partner (α or β)i so f t e nd i ﬃcult to measure and then is not
contractible. To induce investment, at date 0 the two partners sign a contract linking
the partners’ income to the outcome of the joint project. Since the private beneﬁts are
not contractible, the incentive contract is only on veriﬁable revenue R.F o rs i m p l i c i t y ,
we focus on linear revenue-sharing rules. Denote partner A’s revenue share by s and the
lump-sum transfer from B to A by F.T h e nt h ec o n t r a c tg i v e sA ar e v e n u eo fsR + F
and B a revenue of (1 − s)R − F.
T h ep a r t n e r sa l s oa s s i g nc o n t r o lr i g h t so v e rt h ej o i n tp r o j e c ta td a t e0.T h e r ea r et w o
possible arrangements: (1) unilateral control by either A or B, and (2) joint control by A
and B. Under unilateral control, the controlling party can modify the ex ante contracted
production plan to maximize his own payoﬀ instead of the total surplus, while under
joint control, no modiﬁcation to the ex ante contracted plan can be made without the
two parties agreeing otherwise. Therefore, in both cases, there is room for the parties to
bargain to reach a more eﬃcient decision. We consider two extreme cases of bargaining.
In the main case, we assume that, at date 2, decision δ becomes contractible and there
is no asymmetric information about the beneﬁts. Then, under each of the two possible
control arrangements, the two parties will bargain successfully at date 2 without delay
t or e a c ha ne xp o s te ﬃcient decision. In the other case, we assume that bargaining is
so ineﬃcient that it never succeeds in moving the partners beyond their disagreement
payoﬀs. Except in Sections 5.3 and 5.4, we focus on the main case.
103.2 The ex post decision
Before analyzing the partners’ bargaining over the ex post decision δ,w ee l a b o r a t ew h a t
the controlling partner can do with the decision-making power. First, the controlling
partner can expropriate the revenue of the joint venture and the other partner’s private
beneﬁt. Such expropriation can take a variety of forms. The controlling partner of a joint
venture may sell the assets of the joint venture at below-the-market prices to another
entity controlled by its parent company. It may also sell products of the joint venture
to (or buy inputs from) its parent company at below-the-market (or above-the-market)
prices. Such self-dealing activities beneﬁt the parent company of the controlling partner
at the expense of the joint venture. In other words, they redistribute values (or beneﬁts)
between the partners relative to their payoﬀs under the ex ante contracted production
plan. For more and detailed examples, see O’Neal (1987), O’Neal and Thompson (1995),
and Shishido (1987).
In addition to expropriation, the controlling partner can use his power to enhance
the value of the joint venture. In the example of selling the products or the assets,
the controlling partner can use his discretion to sell to a third party at the highest
possible price given the prevailing market condition. Such activities result in Pareto
improvements over the ex ante contracted production plan.
To formalize the above discussion, we assume that the ex post decision consists of
three dimensions of actions. The ﬁrst dimension of actions, denoted by dA, increases
partner A’s private beneﬁta tt h ee x p e n s eo ft h ev e r i ﬁable revenue and partner B’s
private beneﬁt. dB is symmetric to dA.I nc o n t r a s tt ot h eﬁrst two, the third dimension
of actions, denoted by d, increases both partners’ private beneﬁts as well as the veriﬁable
revenue. Hence we have δ =( dA,d B,d). It should be clariﬁed that dA, dB,a n dd are
three dimensions of the same decision and cannot be assigned to diﬀerent partners.
For simplicity, we further impose the following structure on r(δ), a(δ),a n db(δ):
r(dA,d B,d)=r1 − r2dA − r3dB + r4d,
a(dA,d B,d)=a1 + a2dA − a3dB + a4d,
b(dA,d B,d)=b1 − b2dA + b3dB + b4d,
where ri, ai,a n dbi are all positive and dA,d B,d∈ [0,1],w i t h(dA,d B,d)=( 0 ,0,0)
11representing the ex ante contracted production plan.
As a benchmark, note that the ex post eﬃcient decision maximizes the sum of the
two partners’ payoﬀs, namely R + PA + PB. Denote the ex post eﬃcient choice by
(d∗
A,d ∗
B,d ∗). It is clear that d∗ =1 . We assume that expropriation is never eﬃcient.
That is,
a2yA <r 2y + b2yB,
b3yB <r 3y + a3yA.
Then (d∗
A,d ∗
B)=( 0 ,0).
3.3 Speciﬁcation of the bargaining game
We use the Nash bargaining solution to model the date 2 bargaining process between
the partners. Let Vj be partner j’s disagreement payoﬀ,f o rj = A,B.S i n c e t h e d a t e
3 decision is usually ineﬃcient without prior agreement, there is potential for eﬃciency
gain from bargaining. We call this potential gain the renegotiation surplus,w h i c hi s
given by
RS = max
δ
(R + PA + PB) − (VA + VB).
Under the Nash bargaining solution, the payoﬀ to partner j is
Wj = Vj + λjRS
for j = A,B,w h e r eλj is partner j’s bargaining power and λA+λB =1 .D e n o t eλA = λ.
Under joint control, the ex ante contracted production plan cannot be modiﬁed, i.e.,
(dA,d B,d)=( 0 ,0,0) prevails, in the absence of bargaining between the two partners at
date 2. Then the disagreement payoﬀsa r e
VA = a1yA + sr1y,
VB = b1yB +( 1− s)r1y.
Note that, due to the ex ante production plan, the partners still jointly produce veriﬁable
revenue r1y(α,β). Consequently, the ex ante revenue-sharing contract s aﬀects the
disagreement payoﬀs and therefore the investment incentives of the partners.
12Under unilateral control by partner A, without successful bargaining at date 2, A
chooses (dA,d B,d) at date 3 to maximize his own payoﬀ,i . e . ,
max
(dA,dB,d)
(a1 + a2dA − a3dB + a4d)yA(α,β)
+s(r1 − r2dA − r3dB + r4d)y(α,β).
Speciﬁcally, A chooses dB =0 ; d =1 ;a n dd0
A =0if s ≥ a2yA(α,β)/[r2y(α,β)], and
d0
A =1otherwise, where d0
A denotes A’s choice of dA. A chooses d =1because d
increases both the veriﬁable revenue and A’s own private beneﬁt, and dB =0because
dB decreases both the veriﬁable revenue and A’s private beneﬁt. The choice of dA is
less straightforward, as dA increases A’s private beneﬁta tt h ee x p e n s eo ft h ev e r i ﬁable
revenue. Intuitively, A chooses to shift money from the veriﬁable revenue to his private
beneﬁti fh ed o e sn o th a v eas i g n i ﬁcant revenue share. Note that, A’s choice of δ is
independent of the ex ante production plan. Therefore, the ex ante production plan is
irrelevant under unilateral control by A. However, the ex ante revenue-sharing contract
s aﬀects the parties’ disagreement payoﬀs as in the case of joint control, and hence the
investment incentives of the partners.
Similar analysis can be carried out for the case that partner B has the unilateral
control. His optimal choice is: dA =0 ; d =1 ;a n dd0
B =0if s ≤ 1−b3yB(α,β)/[r3y(α,β)],
and d0
B =1otherwise, where d0
B denotes B’s choice of dB.
The above analysis shows that both the revenue-sharing contract and the control
arrangement aﬀect investment incentives. In the remainder of this paper, we discuss the
optimal choice of both revenue-sharing and control arrangements.
4 Optimal Revenue-Sharing and Control Arrange-
ments
To highlight the main results of the model, we ﬁrst focus on the case where a partner’s
private beneﬁt depends only on his own investment and the veriﬁa b l er e v e n u ei sal i n e a r
combination of the partners’ private beneﬁts. Speciﬁcally, yA(α,β)=yA(α),y B(α,β)=
13yB(β),a n dy(α,β)=yA(α)+µyB(β),w h e r eµ>0 is a constant. In this case, α and
β a r es e l fi n v e s t m e n t sr e g a r d i n gt ot h ep r i v a t eb e n e ﬁts. In Section 5.1, we will consider
t h eo p p o s i t ec a s ew h e r eα and β are cooperative (or cross) investments. In Section
5.2, we will consider the more general case where the investments contain both self-
beneﬁting and cooperative elements and the veriﬁable revenue is not necessarily a linear
combination of the private beneﬁts.
Given the speciﬁcation of revenue and private beneﬁts, the partners’ ex post payoﬀs
are linear combinations of yA(α) and yB(β).9 At date 1,p a r t n e rA chooses α to maximize
his payoﬀ WA net of investment cost α, and partner B chooses β to maximize his payoﬀ
WB net of investment cost β. Straightforward computation yields that the ex ante
investments are determined by the following ﬁrst-order conditions:
c
i
1y
0
A(α)=1 ,
c
i
2y
0
B(β)=1 ,
where the superscript i = J, A,o rB, depending on whether the ex post decision is
under joint control, the unilateral control by A,o rt h eu n i l a t e r a lc o n t r o lb yB,a n d
c
J
1 = a1 + sr1 + λ(a4 + r4), (1)
c
J
2 = b1 +( 1− s)µr1 +( 1− λ)(b4 + µr4), (2)
c
A
1 = a1 + a4 + s(r1 + r4)+d
0
A[a2(1 − λ)+r2(λ − s)], (3)
c
A
2 = b1 + b4 +( 1− s)µ(r1 + r4)+d
0
A[µr2(s − λ) − λb2], (4)
c
B
1 = a1 + a4 + s(r1 + r4)+d
0
B[r3(λ − s) − a3(1 − λ)], (5)
c
B
2 = b1 + b4 +( 1− s)µ(r1 + r4)+d
0
B[µr3(s − λ)+λb3]. (6)
We will call a pair of incentive coeﬃcients (c1,c 2) a reduced incentive structure. These
coeﬃcients are determined by the revenue sharing contract and the control arrangement.
As a result of eﬃcient bargaining, the ex post eﬃcient decision (i.e., (d∗
A,d ∗
B,d ∗)=
(0,0,1))w i l lb et a k e na td a t e3, and then the total net surplus (the sum of the two
9We will focus on cases where d0
A and d0
B are independent of α and β.
14partners’ payoﬀs net of their investment costs) will be
(r1 + r4 + a1 + a4)yA(α)+( µr1 + µr4 + b1 + b4)yB(β) − α − β.
To facilitate exposition, we deﬁne U(c1,c 2) as the total net surplus when the ex post
decision δ is chosen eﬃciently and the investment levels are determined by the reduced
incentive structure (c1,c 2),n a m e l y ,
U(c1,c 2)= ( r1 + r4 + a1 + a4)yA(α)+( µr1 + µr4 + b1 + b4)yB(β) − α − β
s.t. c1y0
A(α)=1 ,
c2y0
B(β)=1 .
4.1 The Benchmark
Before comparing various control arrangements in terms of the total net surplus, we
discuss a benchmark case of “central” control where the ex post eﬃcient decision (i.e.,
(d∗
A,d ∗
B,d ∗)=( 0 ,0,1))i sm a d eb yaﬁctitious “central authority” without renegotiation.
Under “central” control, the incentive coeﬃcients are c1 = s(r1 + r4)+a1 + a4 and
c2 =( 1− s)µ(r1 + r4)+b1 + b4, and the total net surplus is U(c1,c 2) for given revenue
sharing contract s.A ss increases from 0 to 1, the reduced incentive structure (c1,c 2)
moves along an incentive line of
µc1 + c2 = µ(r1 + r4)+µ(a1 + a4)+b1 + b4, (7)
and choosing s is equivalent to choosing a pair (c1,c 2) along the line. The sharing rule
that maximizes U(c1,c 2) subject to constraint (7) is called the second-best sharing rule,
or s = sSB.10 The corresponding investments are α = αSB and β = β
SB. This is the
optimal outcome under “central” control. Figure 6 illustrates the second-best outcome
with the help of the following lemma, both conditions of which are satisﬁed when yA
and yB are power functions with the power between 0 and 1.
10We call this the second best because it is optimal under the constraint that eﬀrot is not contractible
and each partner chooses his eﬀort level to maximize his own payoﬀ.U n d e rt h eﬁrst-best outcome where
the partners’ eﬀorts are chosen to maximize their joint payoﬀ, the incentive coeﬃcients for partners A
and B are, respectively, r1 + r4 + a1 + a4 and µr1 + µr4 + b1 + b4.
15Lemma 1: Let (y0
A)−1(1/c1) denote the inverse function of y0
A evaluated at 1/c1 and
similarly for (y0
B)−1(1/c2).S u p p o s e(y0
A)−1(1/c1) is convex and yA[(y0
A)−1(1/c1)] is con-
cave in c1, and (y0
B)−1(1/c2) is convex and yB[(y0
B)−1(1/c2)] is concave in c2.T h e n
U(c1,c 2) is a concave function of c1 and c2.F u r t h e r m o r e ,∂U/∂c1 > 0 if and only if
c1 <r 1 + r4 + a1 + a4,a n d∂U/∂c2 > 0 if and only if c2 <µ r 1 + µr4 + b1 + b4.
Contrary to the assumption for the second-best outcome, the ex post eﬃcient decision
may not be possible without renegotiation and therefore the second-best outcome is not
necessarily achieved. The ﬁnal payoﬀs after the renegotiation, and therefore the incentive
coeﬃcients c1 and c2, depend on the control arrangement.
4.2 Joint Control by A and B
Consider ﬁrst joint control by A and B. Recall from (1)-(2) that the partners’ incentive
coeﬃcients are c1 = sr1+λr4+a1+λa4 and c2 = µ(1−s)r1+µ(1−λ)r4+b1+(1−λ)b4,
and the total net surplus under joint control is U(c1,c 2).A ss increases from 0 to 1,t h e
reduced incentive structure (c1,c 2) moves along an incentive line of
µc1 + c2 = µ(r1 + r4)+µ(a1 + a4)+b1 + b4 − µ(1 − λ)a4 − λb4. (8)
The sharing rule that maximizes U(c1,c 2) subject to constraint (8) is the optimal sharing
rule under the joint control, or s = sJ. However, as the incentive line for joint control
is below that for the second-best [(8) as compared to (7)], joint control is always worse
than the second-best.
Proposition 1 Joint control is always worse than “central” control (or the second-best).
To understand the intuition for Proposition 1, compare equations (7) and (8). Let us
call the right-hand side of each equation the total incentive power for the corresponding
case. We can see that the total incentive power under joint control is less than that under
the second-best by µ(1 − λ)a4 + λb4. The reason for this loss of total incentive power
16under joint control is as follows. Under joint control, the ex post eﬃcient decision is
only made after the two partners reach an agreement in their bargaining. A requirement
for the agreement is a swap of beneﬁts between the partners: part of B’s private beneﬁt
goes to A’s ﬁnal payoﬀ and vice versa. Indeed, we can show that A’s payoﬀ contains
λb4yB and B’s payoﬀ contains (1 − λ)a4yA. Since neither of the partners cares about
the other partner’s payoﬀ, such a swap of beneﬁts reduces the total incentive power
for the two partners. Under the second-best, however, the ex post eﬃcient decision is
made without renegotiation and thus there is no loss of total incentive power. It is this
diﬀerence in the total incentive power that makes joint control less eﬃcient than the
second-best outcome.
We next consider unilateral control. To clearly illustrate the main points, we focus
on two sets of parameter conditions speciﬁed below.11
4.3 Unilateral Control When Expropriation Can Be Avoided
Without Renegotiation
Suppose sSB ≥ a2/r2.T h e nsSB >a 2yA(α)/{r2[yA(α)+µyB(β)]} for any α and β.I t
follows from our analysis in Section 3.3 that, given s = sSB, A as a controlling partner
will always choose d0
A =0regardless the values of α and β. By substituting d0
A =0into
(3) and (4), we obtain the partners’ incentive coeﬃcients: c1 = s(r1 + r4)+a1 +a4 and
c2 =( 1−s)µ(r1+r4)+b1+b4.N o t et h a tt h ec o e ﬃcients are the same as those under the
second-best, because the ex post eﬃcient decision is made by A without any bargaining.
Hence, A and B will choose the second-best investments, αSB and β
SB. Therefore, the
second-best outcome is guaranteed under A’s control. In summary, we have:
Proposition 2 If a2 ≤ sSBr2, A’s control can yield the second-best outcome and is thus
better than joint control.
11A complete analysis without these restrictions on the parameters yields qualitatively similar results,
and the detailed proof is available upon request.
17Proposition 2 says that unilateral control by A is better than joint control if A’s
gain in private beneﬁt( a2) from expropriating B is small relative to the total loss of
veriﬁable revenue (r2). This result is not surprising. When A cannot gain very much
private beneﬁt from his opportunistic behavior, the loss of his portion of the veriﬁable
revenue dominates and he then has no incentive to engage in the opportunistic behavior.
Then A as a controlling partner voluntarily makes only the Pareto-improving changes
to the ex ante contracted production plans, which is the second-best outcome.
A result similar to Proposition 2 can also be derived for B’s unilateral control. The
suboptimality of joint control given in Proposition 2 corresponds to that derived from
the GHM model.
The next result concerns the relationship between revenue sharing and control arrange-
ments.
Proposition 3 Suppose a2 = b3 and r2 = r3.T h e n :( i )I fmin{sSB,1 − sSB} ≥ a2/r2,
A’s control and B’s control are equally eﬃcient and are both better than joint control. (ii)
If min{sSB,1 − sSB} <a 2/r2 ≤ max{sSB,1 − sSB}, the partner with majority revenue
share should have the control right. (iii) In both cases, s = sSB and the second-best is
achieved.
Proposition 3 can be restated as follows. Suppose the eﬀects of expropriation on the
partner’s own private beneﬁta n do nt h ev e r i ﬁa b l er e v e n u ea r et h es a m ea c r o s sp a r t n e r s .
Then: (i) If the gain in private beneﬁti ss m a l lr e l a t i v et ot h el o s si nv e r i ﬁable revenue for
both partners, unilateral control under each partner is better than joint control. (ii) If
t h eg a i ni np r i v a t eb e n e ﬁt is small relative to the loss in veriﬁable revenue for one partner
but the opposite is true for the other partner, the ﬁrst partner should be assigned both
the control right and the majority of revenue share. (iii) In both cases, the second-best
can be achieved by giving the controlling partner the second-best level of revenue share.
Under the condition speciﬁed in Proposition 3(i), as a controlling partner, neither
A nor B would choose an ex post ineﬃcient decision. Thus the second-best outcome
is obtained under each partner’s unilateral control. Under the condition speciﬁed in
Proposition 3(ii), however, the partner with a lower revenue share would choose an ex
18post ineﬃcient decision while the partner with a higher revenue share would choose the
ex post eﬃcient decision. Thus, the second-best outcome is obtained only when the
partner with a higher revenue share has the control rights. Intuitively, a controlling
partner’s cost of expropriating the other partner is higher if he has a higher share of
the veriﬁable revenue. To the extent that the controlling partner’s expropriation can be
made an empty threat and hence the second-best outcome can be obtained, he should
be given a larger share of the revenue for this purpose. In this case, revenue-sharing
contracts and control arrangements are complements in the provision of incentive for
team production.12
4.4 Unilateral Control When Expropriation Cannot Be Avoided
Without Renegotiation
Suppose a2yA(α) >r 2[yA(α)+µyB(β)] for all α and β. Then, for all s,w eh a v e
a2yA(α)/{r2[yA(α)+µyB(β)]} > 1 ≥ s. It follows from our analysis in Section 3.3 that
A as a controlling partner will always choose d0
A =1regardless the values of α and β.
By substituting d0
A =1into (3) and (4), we get the partners’ incentive coeﬃcients: c1 =
s(r1+r4)+a1+a4+(λ−s)r2+(1−λ)a2 and c2 =( 1 −s)µ(r1+r4)+b1+b4+(s−λ)µr2−λb2.
As s increases from 0 to 1, the reduced incentive structure (c1,c 2) moves along an in-
centive line
µc1 + c2 = µ(r1 + r4)+µ(a1 + a4)+b1 + b4 + µ(1 − λ)a2 − λb2. (9)
If µ(1−λ)a4+λb4 <λ b 2−µ(1−λ)a2, the incentive line under unilateral control by A [i.e.,
(9)] is below that under joint control [i.e., (8)]. If we further assume that the optimal
revenue-sharing contract under joint control, sJ,i sinterior (hence, the indiﬀerence curve
passing through sJ is above the incentive line under A’s control), then unilateral control
by A is worse than joint control. Therefore, we have
12For a widely held ﬁrm, the one-share-one-vote rule ensures that controlling shareholders sell their
stake to a corporate raider who can manage a higher value of the ﬁrm’s securities but not his private
beneﬁt of control (Grossman and Hart, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 1988).
19Proposition 4 Suppose a2yA(α) >r 2[yA(α)+µyB(β)] for all α and β.F u r t h e ra s s u m e
that the optimal revenue-sharing contract under joint control, sJ, is interior. Then, if
µ(1 − λ)a4 + λb4 <λ b 2 − µ(1 − λ)a2, (10)
A’s control is worse than joint control.
Proposition 4 says that, given the loss of total incentive power under joint control
[µ(1 − λ)a4 + λb4], A’s control is worse than joint control if A’s gain in private beneﬁt
(a2) from expropriating B is small relative to the resulting loss in B’s private beneﬁt
(b2).
The intuition for Proposition 4 is related to that for Proposition 1. Given that
a2yA(α) >r 2[yA(α)+µyB(β)] for all α and β, A as the controlling partner will choose
d0
A =1unless he is bribed by B to do otherwise. The amount of bribe that B has to
pay increases with A’s potential gain, a2yA,a n dB’s potential loss, b2yB,f r o md0
A =1 .
Therefore, A has higher, and B has lower, incentives for investment. However, the total
incentive power is reduced by λb2−µ(1−λ)a2 [or the right-hand side of (10)] compared
with the second-best. If b2 is very large, so that this loss of total incentive power is larger
than the loss of total incentive power under joint control [i.e., µ(1 − λ)a4 + λb4,o rt h e
left-hand side of (10)], then the incentive line under A’s control is below that under joint
control. This implies that unilateral control by A is worse than joint control, because
sJ is interior.
Finally, we address the question of whether the controlling partner should be given
the majority of revenue share. To highlight our main point, we consider a (partially)
symmetric case where µ =1 ,a 1 = b1,a 4 = b4,λ =1 /2, and yA(·)=yB(·). The
incentive line under A’s control is higher than that under joint control if condition (10)
is violated (i.e., a2 −b2 +a4 +b4 > 0), and it is also higher than that under B’s control
if a2 −b2+a3−b3 > 0. Thus, in this symmetric case, the mid point of the incentive line
under A’s control is the one closest to the ﬁrst best, and it can be obtained by giving
partner B a majority of revenue share if a2 +b2 < 2(r1+r4 −r2). Intuitively, as partner
A cannot be prevented from expropriating partner B, it obtains signiﬁcant incentive
from the control arrangement. Given the equal importance of the two partners in the
20joint project, partner B should then be given the majority of revenue share to achieve
a balance in the provision of incentive. Hence revenue-sharing contracts and control
arrangements are substitutes, in contrast to the case of Proposition 3. We summarize
the above results in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5 Suppose a2yA(α) >r 2[yA(α)+µyB(β)] for all α and β, µ =1 ,a 1 = b1,
a4 = b4,λ=1 /2, and yA(·)=yB(·).I fa2 − b2 + a4 + b4 > 0,a 2 − b2 + a3 − b3 > 0, and
a2 + b2 < 2(r1 + r4 − r2),t h e nA’s control is uniquely optimal but the optimal revenue
share for A is less than 50%.
Note that this result of substitution between the control right and the revenue share
is derived for the case with a great deal of symmetry between the partners. In the
asymmetric case, as one partner’s importance increases relative to the other partner’s,
the ﬁrst partner’s control right and revenue share should both increase, at least weakly.
Results similar to Propositions 4-5 can also be derived for B’s unilateral control. An
immediate implication of the propositions in this section and their counterparts for the
case of unilateral control by B is that joint control can be optimal only when there is
potential for expropriation.
5 Alternative Assumptions
I no u ra n a l y s i ss of a r ,w eh a v em a i n t a i n e dt w oi m p o r t a n ta s s u m p t i o n s .O n ei st h a te a c h
partner’s investment is self-investment that does not aﬀect the other partner’s private
beneﬁt. The other is that the ex post bargaining is eﬃcient so that the ex post eﬃcient
decision will always be taken without delay after some transfer is made. In this section,
we consider alternatives and extensions to these assumptions. We will also consider a
model where there is no ex ante investment. To economize on exposition, we will omit
explicit consideration of unilateral control by B in part of this section as it is symmetric
to unilateral control by A.
215.1 Cooperative investment
Recent literature on the theory of the ﬁrm has paid considerable attention to cooperative
investment, a party’s investment that has a positive eﬀect on the private beneﬁto fh i s
trading partner. For example, Che and Hausch (1999) show that it is optimal not to
write any ex ante contract at all when the investments made by the trading partners are
cooperative. Segal and Whinston (2000) argue that ex post renegotiation is desirable
when one partner’s investment has a direct externality on the other partner’s payoﬀ.
Whinston (2002) investigates the empirical implications of the Property Rights Theory
of the ﬁrm when investment contains both self and cross components. Bai and Tao
(2000) consider the implication of investment externality on various legal remedies for
the breach of contracts.
In this subsection, we consider the implication of assuming cooperative investment
instead of self investment in our model. For this, we replace the assumptions in the ﬁrst
paragraph of Section 4 by the assumptions that yA(α,β)=yA(β),y B(α,β)=yB(α),a n d
y(α,β)=yA(β)+µyB(α),w h e r eµ>0 is a constant. We will still assume renegotiation
eﬃciency in this subsection.
Similar to Section 4, the partners’ ex ante investments are determined by
ci
1y0
B(α)=1
ci
2y0
A(β)=1
where partners’ incentive coeﬃcients ci
1 and ci
2 depend on the control arrangement i and
the revenue sharing contract s. The optimal control and revenue sharing arrangements
are chosen to maximize
U(c1,c 2)= ( r1 + r4 + a1 + a4)yA(β)+( µr1 + µr4 + b1 + b4)yB(α) − α − β
s.t. c1y0
B(α)=1 ,
c2y0
A(β)=1 .
Straightforward computation yields that
c
J
1 = sµr1 + λ(b4 + µr4),
22c
J
2 =( 1− s)r1 +( 1− λ)(a4 + r4),
c
A
1 = sµ(r1 + r4)+d
0
A[(λ − s)µr2 + λb2],
c
A
2 =( 1− s)(r1 + r4)+d
0
A[(s − λ)r2 − (1 − λ)a2].
Furthermore, under the benchmark case of “central” control where the ex post eﬃcient
decision is taken at once without bargaining, the parties’ incentive coeﬃcients are:
c1 = sµ(r1 + r4),
c2 =( 1− s)(r1 + r4).
As s increases from 0 to 1, the reduced incentive structure (c1,c 2) moves along an
incentive line. Under joint control, the incentive line is
c
J
1 + µc
J
2 = µ(r1 + r4)+λb4 +( 1− λ)µa4.
Under “central” control, the incentive line is
c1 + µc2 = µ(r1 + r4).
It is easy to see that the incentive line under joint control is above that under “central”
control. Therefore, if the optimal s under joint control is an interior solution, joint
control is better than “central” control. This result is the opposite of Proposition 1 but
is consistent with Segal and Whinston’s (2000) result that renegotiation is desirable with
cooperative investment.
Under unilateral control by A, the incentive line is
c
A
1 + µc
A
2 = µ(r1 + r4)+d
0
A[λb2 − (1 − λ)µa2].
If A does not expropriate even without renegotiation, that is d0
A =0 , then the incentive
line is the same as under “central” control. Consequently, this case is dominated by
joint control. This result is the opposite of Proposition 2. If A does expropriate without
renegotiation, that is d0
A =1 ,a n dt h eo p t i m a ls is an interior solution, then joint control
is better than unilateral control by A if and only if
µ(1 − λ)a4 + λb4 >λ b 2 − µ(1 − λ)a2.
23This result is the opposite of Proposition 4. That is, self investment and cooperative
investment give us results about the relative optimality of joint control vs. unilateral
control that are diagonal to each other. Particularly, in contrast to the case with self
investment, when the partners’ investments are cooperative, joint control is optimal if
there is no expropriation. The counterpart of Proposition 4 is as follows.
Proposition 6 Suppose the partners make cooperative investment and a2yA(β) >r 2[yA(β)+
µyB(α)] for all α and β. Further assume that the optimal revenue-sharing contract under
joint control, sJ, is interior. Then joint control is better than unilateral control by A if
and only if
µ(1 − λ)a4 + λb4 >λ b 2 − µ(1 − λ)a2.
Regarding the relationship between the revenue sharing and control arrangements,
note that d0
A has to be 1 for unilateral control by A to be optimal. This implies that A as a
controlling shareholder should be given a low revenue share. It is because a low revenue
share induces A to expropriate B, which would result in renegotiation that enhances
the investment incentives of both partners in the case of cooperative investments. In
addition, as A enjoys extra payoﬀ from his control, he should be given a low revenue share
to achieve balanced incentives between the partners. Similar result holds for unilateral
control by B. Hence, control right and cash ﬂo wr i g h ta r es u b s t i t u t e si nt h i sc a s ew h e r e
the partners make cooperative investment.
Proposition 7 Suppose the partners make cooperative investment. Then, when it is
optimal to give a partner unilateral control, it is also optimal to give him a low revenue
share.
This result gives us another diﬀerence between self investment and cooperative in-
vestment. Under the former, the revenue sharing and control arrangements can be
complements as well as substitutes, while under the latter, the two arrangements can
only be substitutes.
245.2 A General Setting of the Model
Section 4 and Section 5.1 considered the two extreme cases of pure self investments and
pure cooperative investments (with respect to the private beneﬁts) respectively. In this
subsection, we consider a more general setting of the model to check the robustness of our
main results. We maintain the speciﬁcation of the private beneﬁts and veriﬁable revenue
given in Section 3, but use more general forms for functions yA(α,β), yB(α,β),a n d
y(α,β), instead of the special forms considered in Section 4 and Sections 5.1. Speciﬁcally,
we assume that
yA(α,β)=a5 + a6α + a7β,
yB(α,β)=b5 + b6α + b7β,
y(α,β)= r5 + r6α + r7β,
where the a’s, b’s, and r’s are non-negative. We use linear functions as in Whinston
(2002) to facilitate comparison between our results and his as well as to make the analysis
tractable. We further assume that the costs of investments α and β are φA(α) and φB(β)
respectively. The speciﬁcation in Section 4 is a special case of the current general setting
where a7 =0 , b6 =0 , φ
0
A(α)=1 /y0
A(α), φ
0
B(α)=1 /y0
B(β),a n dµ = a6r7/r6b7.T h e
assumption there that the veriﬁable revenue is a linear combination of the partners’
private beneﬁts is implied by the assumption that the partners’ investments are purely
self investments and functions yA(α,β), yB(α,β),a n dy(α,β) are linear. A similar
statement can be made about the speciﬁcation in Section 5.1. However, except for these
two extreme cases, our more general speciﬁcation here no longer requires the veriﬁable
revenue to be a linear combination of the private beneﬁts.
Similarly to Section 4, the partners’ ex ante investments are determined by
ci
1 = φ
0
A(α),
ci
2 = φ
0
B(β),
where the partners’ incentive coeﬃcients ci
1 and ci
2 depend on the control arrangement i
and the revenue sharing contract s. The optimal control and revenue sharing arrange-
ments are chosen to maximize
25U(c1,c 2)= [ ( a1 + a4)a6 +( b1 + b4)b6 +( r1 + r4)r6]α − φA(α)
+[(a1 + a4)a7 +( b1 + b4)b7 +( r1 + r4)r7]β − φB(β)
s.t. c1 = φ
0
A(α),c 2 = φ
0
B(β).
Straightforward computation yields that
cJ
1 =( a1 + λa4)a6 + λb4b6 +( sr1 + λr4)r6,
cJ
2 =( 1 − λ)a4a7 +[ b1 +( 1− λ)b4]b7 +[ ( 1− s)r1 +( 1− λ)r4]r7,
cA
1 =[ a1 + a4 +( 1− λ)a2d0
A]a6 + λb2d0
Ab6 +[ sr1 + sr4 +( λ − s)r2d0
A]r6,
cA
2 = −(1 − λ)a2d0
Aa7 +( b1 + b4 − λb2d0
A)b7 +[ ( 1− s)(r1 + r4)+( s − λ)r2d0
A]r7.
Furthermore, under the benchmark case of “central” control where the ex post eﬃcient
decision is taken at once without bargaining, the parties’ incentive coeﬃcients are:
c1 =( a1 + a4)a6 + s(r1 + r4)r6,
c2 =( b1 + b4)b7 +( 1− s)(r1 + r4)r7.
As s increases from 0 to 1, the reduced incentive structure (c1,c 2) moves along an
incentive line. The incentive lines are
r7c
J
1 + r6c
J
2 =( r1 + r4)r6r7 +[ ( a1 + λa4)a6 + λb4b6]r7 +
{(1 − λ)a4a7 +[ b1 +( 1− λ)b4]b7}r6,
r7c
A
1 + r6c
A
2 =( r1 + r4)r6r7 + {[a1 + a4 +( 1− λ)a2d
0
A]a6 + λb2d
0
Ab6}r7 +
[−(1 − λ)a2d
0
Aa7 +( b1 + b4 − λb2d
0
A)b7]r6,
r7c1 + r6c2 =( r1 + r4)r6r7 +( a1 + a4)a6r7 +( b1 + b4)b7r6.
respectively, under joint control, under unilateral control by A, and under “central”
control. If
(1 − λ)a4a7r6 + λb4b6r7 < (1 − λ)a4a6r7 + λb4b7r6, (11)
then the incentive line under joint control is lower than that under “central” control and
hence the bargaining needed to reach the decision d =1has a negative eﬀect on the
26partners’ total incentives, as is the case where the investment is purely self-beneﬁting.
In this case, all the results in Section 4 hold qualitatively. This is not surprising because
inequality (11) means that the self-beneﬁting element of the investment dominates its
cooperative element. If the opposite of (11) is true, the cooperative element of the
investment dominates its self-beneﬁting element and all the results in Subsection 5.1 hold
qualitatively. Therefore, the main results we got in earlier analysis are not restricted to
the extreme cases of pure self investment or pure cooperative investment; collectively,
Section 4 and Section 5.1 cover all the possible results in our general setting considered in
the current subsection. To highlight the key insights, we will revert to the consideration
of the two extreme cases of pure self investments and pure cooperative investments in
the remainder of this section.
5.3 Ineﬃc i e n tE xP o s tB a r g a i n i n g
In this subsection, we assume that ex post bargaining is so ineﬃcient that it never
succeeds in moving the partners beyond their disagreement payoﬀs. We consider the
case of self investment and that of cooperative investment separately, and adopt the
speciﬁcation of private beneﬁt and revenue functions in Se c t i o n4a n dt h a to fS e c t i o n
5.1 respectively.
Self Investment
From the partners’ disagreement payoﬀs, it is easy to compute their respective in-
centive coeﬃcients under joint control and unilateral control by A. The case for the
second-best is also straightforward. Speciﬁcally, we have:
c
J
1 = a1 + sr1,
c
J
2 = b1 +( 1− s)µr1,
c
A
1 = a1 + d
0
Aa2 + a4 + s(r1 − d
0
Ar2 + r4),
c
A
2 = b1 − d
0
Ab2 + b4 +( 1− s)µ(r1 − d
0
Ar2 + r4),
c1 = a1 + a4 + s(r1 + r4),
27c2 = b1 + b4 +( 1− s)µ(r1 + r4).
In contrast to the case with eﬃcient bargaining, the decision taken at date 3 depends
on the control arrangement because ineﬃcient action can no longer be bargained away.
The total surpluses between the partners under joint control, under unilateral control
by A, and under the second best environment are respectively
U
J =( a1 + r1)yA(α)+( b1 + µr1)yB(β),
U
A =( a1 +a2d
0
A +a4 +r1 −r2d
0
A +r4)yA(α)+[b1 −b2d
0
A +b4 +µ(r1 −r2d
0
A +r4)]yB(β),
U =( a1 + a4 + r1 + r4)yA(α)+[ b1 + b4 + µ(r1 + r4)]yB(β).
It can be shown that Propositions 1-3 in Section 4 remain to hold without any modiﬁca-
tion. Proposition 4, however, has to be modiﬁed. When d0
A =1 , joint control provides
better ex ante investment incentives than unilateral control by A if
µa4 + b4 + µr4 <b 2 − µa2 + µr2. (12)
Meanwhile, UJ >U A if
a2 + a4 + r4 <r 2, and b4 + µr4 <b 2 + µr2. (13)
It follows that joint control is better than unilateral control by A if conditions (12) and
(13) are both satisﬁed. This result is qualitatively very similar to that in Proposition 4;
it implies that joint control is better than unilateral control if the cost of expropriation
is suﬃciently large relative to the beneﬁt of the Pareto improving action. Proposition 5
can be similarly modiﬁed and interpreted.
The above analysis suggests that the results of our model with self investment are
robust with respect to various assumptions about the eﬃciency of the ex post bargaining.
B yt h es a m et o k e n ,i ta l s os u g g e s t st h a tw i t hs e l fi n v e s t m e n tw ec a n n o te m p i r i c a l l yt e s t
the bargaining eﬃciency by looking at the control and revenue share arrangements.
Cooperative investment
The situation with cooperative investment is diﬀerent. In this case, we have
c
J
1 = sµr1,
28c
J
2 =( 1− s)r1,
c
A
1 = sµ(r1 − d
0
Ar2 + r4),
c
A
2 =( 1− s)(r1 − d
0
Ar2 + r4),
c1 = sµ(r1 + r4),
c2 =( 1− s)(r1 + r4).
U
J =( a1 + r1)yA(β)+( b1 + µr1)yB(α),
U
A =( a1 +a2d
0
A +a4 +r1 −r2d
0
A +r4)yA(β)+[b1 −b2d
0
A +b4 +µ(r1 −r2d
0
A +r4)]yB(α),
U =( a1 + a4 + r1 + r4)yA(β)+[ b1 + b4 + µ(r1 + r4)]yB(α).
It follows immediately that joint control is worse than “central” control, which can be
called the second best again in this case; that is, Proposition 1 holds in this case. If A
does not expropriate when he has control, A’s control is the same as the second best, just
as in Section 4.3. Therefore, Propositions 2 and 3 also hold in this case. If A expropriates
when he has control, i.e., d0
A =1 , then joint control provides better investment incentives
than unilateral control by A if r2 >r 4. In addition, UJ >U A if
r2 − a2 >r 4 + a4,and b2 + µr2 >µ r 4 + b4.
These inequalities hold if r2 is suﬃciently large. However, if r2 is large, A will not have
strong incentive to expropriate because the loss of his share of the revenue would be
large. This argument suggests that, the condition for joint control to be optimal in this
case may be very stringent.
In summary, the qualitative results in the main case with self investment remain valid
in this case but the likelihood for joint control to be optimal is low here. Furthermore, in
view of the analysis in Section 5.1 (cooperative investment with eﬃcient bargaining), it is
clear that the results on cooperative investments are sensitive to the various assumptions
on bargaining eﬃciency.
295.4 The Case of No Ex Ante Investment
O n eo ft h em o s ti m p o r t a n td i ﬀerences between the Transaction Cost Economics view
of the organization championed by Williamson (1975, 1979, 1985) and Klein, Crawford,
and Alchian (1978) and the Property Rights Theory of the organization due to GHM is
that the former focuses on the costs of ex post decision making while the latter focuses
on the distortion to ex ante investment incentives. Our analysis so far has taken the
Property Rights Theory approach, although Section 5.3 also considered the costs of
ex post decision making. In this subsection, we take the Transaction Cost Economics
approach and consider a framework in which there is no ex ante investment.
We keep the same model speciﬁcation as in Section 3, except that the project’s
veriﬁable revenue and the partners’ private beneﬁts collapse to the coeﬃcients, r(δ),
a(δ) and b(δ) respectively. That is:
R = r(δ)=r1 − r2dA − r3dB + r4d,
PA = a(δ)=a1 + a2dA − a3dB + a4d,
PB = b(δ)=b1 − b2dA + b3dB + b4d.
Subsequently, the conditions for expropriation to be ineﬃcient collapse to r2 + b2 >a 2
and r3 + a3 >b 3.T h e e x p o s t e ﬃcient decision remains (d∗
A,d ∗
B,d ∗)=( 0 ,0,1).I f
the bargaining about date 3 decision is eﬃcient, eﬃcient decision will always be taken
independent of the control arrangements. Without ex ante investment, joint control
and unilateral control are then equally eﬃcient. To explore possible trade-oﬀs between
various control arrangements, we focus on the case of no renegotiation in the remainder
of this subsection. The results will be the same for any positive probability of bargaining
failure.
When there is no ex post renegotiation, the two partners’ payoﬀs are equal to the
default payoﬀs considered in Section 3.3, that is, WA = VA and WB = VB. The default
situation under joint control is that no modiﬁcation can be made to the ex ante con-
tracted production plan (i.e., neither expropriation nor the good action can be taken).
It follows that:
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J
A = V
J
A = a1 + sr1,
W
J
B = V
J
B = b1 +( 1− s)r1,
W
J = W
J
A + W
J
B = a1 + b1 + r1,
where WJ is the total payoﬀ under joint control.
The default situation under unilateral control by A is that the controlling partner
chooses δ to maximize his payoﬀ,n a m e l y ,
V
A
A =m a x
δ
[(a1 + a2dA − a3dB + a4d)+s(r1 − r2dA − r3dB + r4d)]
= a1 + a4 + s(r1 + r4)+m a x
dA
[(a2 − sr2)dA].
= a1 + a4 + s(r1 + r4)+( a2 − sr2)d
0
A.
where d0
A denotes A’s optimal choice of dA, and it is equal to 1 if a2 >s r 2 but 0 otherwise.
Subsequently, we have:
V
A
B = b1 + b4 +( 1− s)(r1 + r4) − [b2 +( 1− s)r2]d
0
A.
W
A = V
A
A + V
A
B = a1 + a4 + b1 + b4 + r1 + r4 +( a2 − b2 − r2)d
0
A,
where WA is the total payoﬀ under unilateral control by A. The analysis for the unilat-
eral control by B is similar. Speciﬁcally, we have:
V
B
A = a1 + a4 + s(r1 + r4) − (a3 + sr3)d
0
B.
V
B
B = b1 + b4 +( 1− s)(r1 + r4)+[ b3 − (1 − s)r3]d
0
B.
W
B = V
B
A + V
B
B = a1 + a4 + b1 + b4 + r1 + r4 +( b3 − a3 − r3)d
0
B,
where d0
B is controlling partner B’s optimal choice of dB, and it is equal to 1 if b3 >
(1 − s)r3 but 0 otherwise.
With no ex ante investment by the partners, we only need to look at the total payoﬀ
in order to rank various control arrangements. Note ﬁr s tt h a tt h et o t a lp a y o ﬀ under
the ex post eﬃcient decision is a1 + a4 + b1 + b4 + r1 + r4, which is always higher than
31the total payoﬀ under joint control. The total payoﬀ under unilateral control depends
crucially on d0
A or d0
B; and it is equal to that under the ex post eﬃcient decision if d0
A or
d0
B turns out to be 0. Hence we have the ﬁrst set of results.
Proposition 8 Suppose there is no ex post renegotiation. (i) If a2 ≤ r2, then there
exists some s such that a2 ≤ sr2 and d0
A =0 .I nt h i sc a s e ,WA >W J, i.e., unilateral
control by A is better than joint control. (ii) If b3 ≤ r3, then there exists some s such
that b2 ≤ (1 − s)r3 and d0
B =0 . In this case, WB >W J, i.e., unilateral control by B is
better than joint control. In both cases, the maximum surplus is obtained.
The intuition for the above proposition is similar to that of Proposition 2 in Section
4.3. When the gain in private beneﬁt from expropriating minority shareholder is lower
than the loss in veriﬁable revenue, there exists some revenue sharing arrangement such
that the controlling shareholder will voluntarily refrain from expropriating the other
partner. Hence the decision taken by the controlling shareholder is ex post eﬃcient,
and the optimality of unilateral control follows immediately. If a2 >r 2 and b3 >r 3,
the expropriation by controlling shareholder cannot be avoided under either form of
unilateral control, and the resulting total payoﬀ is lower than that under the ex post
eﬃcient decision. Then there is a trade-oﬀs between joint control and unilateral control.
Speciﬁcally,
Proposition 9 Suppose there is no ex post renegotiation. Assume that a2 >r 2 and b3
>r 3. (i) Joint control is optimal if
a4 + b4 + r4 < min{r2 + b2 − a2,r 3 + a3 − b3}.
(ii) Unilateral control by A is optimal if
r2 + b2 − a2 < min{a4 + b4 + r4,r 3 + a3 − b3}.
(iii) Unilateral control by B is optimal if
r3 + a3 − b3 < min{a4 + b4 + r4,r 2 + b2 − a2}.
32Similar to Proposition 4 in Section 4.4, the above proposition captures the fundamen-
tal trade-oﬀs between unilateral control and joint control. The ineﬃciency of unilateral
control (r2+b2−a2 or r3+a3−b3) arises from the possibility that the controlling partner
may expropriate the minority shareholder. In contrast, the ineﬃciency of joint control
(a4 + b4 + r4) comes from the inability to take the good action. The optimal control
arrangement is the one that has the lowest ineﬃciency.
F i n a l l y ,w er e - e x a m i n et h ei n t e r a c t i o n sb e t w e e nc o n t r o lr i g h ta n dr e v e n u es h a r i n g
arrangements when there is no ex ante investment. Recall the condition under which
controlling shareholder will voluntarily refrain from expropriating the minority share-
holder, i.e., a2 ≤ sr2 in the case of unilateral control by A or b2 ≤ (1 − s)r3 in the
case of unilateral control by B. It is clear the condition is more likely to hold when
the controlling shareholder has more revenue share. This implies that, so long as it is
possible to induce the controlling shareholder to refrain from expropriating the minority
shareholder by giving the former high revenue share, control right and revenue sharing
arrangements should be complementary. When the controlling shareholder cannot be
induced not to expropriate the minority shareholder (i.e., a2 >r 2 and b3 >r 3), however,
there is no prediction about the relationship between revenue sharing and control right
arrangements. It is because, unlike in Section 4, there is no ex ante investment, and
therefore no need to balance incentive by giving the minority shareholder high revenue
share to compensate for the expropriation by the majority shareholder. To conclude, we
have:
Proposition 10 When a2 <r 2 or b3 <r 3, revenue sharing and control right arrange-
ments are complementary. Otherwise, there is no deﬁnitive relationship between the two
arrangements.
6 More Empirical Analysis
In Section 2, we presented some basic empirical ﬁndings about task allocation, revenue
sharing and control arrangements in joint ventures. As far as we know, there is no
33theoretical model in the existing literature that is consistent with all the basic facts. In
Sections 3-5, we attempted to ﬁll in this void by presenting and analyzing a theoretical
model under various assumptions. Under the assumptions of cooperative investment
and no bargaining, it is very diﬃcult to satisfy the condition for joint control to be
optimal. This is inconsistent with the prevalence of joint control that we reported in
Section 2. The model under other assumptions is consistent with the basic facts. To
further examine the empirical validity of these assumptions, we lay out and test more of
their empirical implications in this section. We consider three cases separately. The ﬁrst
case is for self investment. For this case, we will not concern ourselves with bargaining
eﬃciency as it does not aﬀect the qualitative results. The second case is for cooperative
investment with eﬃcient bargaining. The third case focuses on the scenarios in which
there is no ex ante investment.
6.1 Hypotheses under Self Investment and Data Description
We begin with the case of self-investment, and develop testable hypotheses about the
determinants of control right and revenue sharing arrangements. For this purpose, we
ﬁrst quantify various possible control arrangements for each decision in the joint venture
and then construct some aggregate measures. Consider decision i in joint venture j,
where i =1 ,...,15 and j =1 ,...,200. The decision could be under unilateral control by
the Chinese partner, or joint control, or unilateral control by the foreign partner, with
increasing degrees of foreign control. Deﬁne FCij to be 1 if unilateral control by the
Chinese partner, 2 if joint control, and 3 if unilateral control by the foreign partner.
Then FCij is a measure of the degree of control by the foreign partner on decision i in
joint venture j. The aggregate degree of control by the foreign partner in joint venture
j can be proxied by FCj =
15 P
i=1
FC ij.13 T h ed e g r e eo fjoint control in joint venture j,
denoted by JCj, can be proxied by the number of decisions that are under joint control
in the joint venture (i.e., for given j,t h en u m b e ro fFCij’s that are equal to 2 where
i =1 ,...,15).
13Equal weighting is assumed for the ﬁfteen decisions in a joint venture.
34Of the potential determinants of the control arrangements, two are readily available
from the sample; they are the year of establishment (YEAR)a n dt h es i z eo fi n v e s t m e n t
(INV) of a joint venture. We believe that, as time progresses, three factors may have
helped mitigate the expropriation problem. One is that the legal environment has been
improving in China in the past twenty years and as a consequence there is better le-
gal protection of minority shareholders, which limits expropriation by the controlling
shareholders. The second is that, as time goes by, more domestic partners have achieved
good reputation and therefore become less inclined to engage in expropriation for the
fear of losing their hard-won reputation. Finally, more information becomes available
about potential joint venture partners and more trust worthy partners can be identiﬁed.
Because of these factors, the need for joint control to limit expropriation decreases over
t h ey e a r sa n dw eh a v et h ef o l l o w i n gh y p o t h e s i s :
Hypothesis 1: The degree of joint control decreases over time.
The size of investment may aﬀect the control arrangement in many diﬀerent ways. For
example, conventional wisdom has that foreign partners are contributors of capital and
therefore should be given more control when the size of investment is large. On the
other hand, large projects are more likely to be in industries considered strategic by the
Chinese government and foreign control may be restricted in these industries. It is hard
to guess ap r i o r iwhat the net eﬀect is.
In addition to YEAR and INV, we construct two potential explanatory variables
from the sample. One variable, F_CHN, is a dummy variable indicating whether or not
the foreign partner of a joint venture is from Hong Kong, Macau, Singapore or Taiwan,
with F_CHN =1if the answer is yes. Partners from Hong Kong, Macau, Singapore or
Taiwan share a similar cultural background with the domestic partners. They speak the
same language as, and may even have kinship relationships with, the domestic partners
(Lin and Png, 2002). We believe that it is easier for them to ﬁnd other ways to mitigate
the expropriation problem and consequently they are less reliant on joint control than
other foreign partners. For example, the spread of bad words by or among people of the
same ethnicity may have very strong negative eﬀect on future investment opportunities
of the perpetrator of expropriation. Therefore, we hypothesize that
Hypothesis 2: There is less joint control when the foreign partner is from a similar
35cultural background as the domestic partner than otherwise.
We also consider a variable FTASK deﬁned as the number of tasks assigned to the
foreign partner of a joint venture.14 We believe that this variable is indicative of the
level of contribution the foreign partner makes to the joint venture. We hypothesize that
t h ed e g r e eo fc o n t r o lb yt h ef o r e i g np a r t n e r ,FC, increases with his level of contribution
to the joint venture, and so does the equity share of the foreign partner, denoted by
FESHARE, of which data is also available from our sample. This seems to contradict
Proposition 5 where the control right and the revenue share are substitutes as incentive
devices. However, Proposition 5 only applies to the case where the relative importance
of the two partners’ contributions to the joint venture is given. When one partner’s
contribution becomes relatively more important and hence should be given stronger
incentives, both his control right and revenue share should be increased. Thus, we have
Hypothesis 3: T h ed e g r e eo fc o n t r o lb yt h ef o r e i g np a r t n e ri n c r e a s e sw i t ht h en u m b e r
of tasks assigned to him.
Hypothesis 4: The equity share to the foreign partner increases with the number of
tasks assigned to him.
Besides the four potential explanatory variables discussed above, one piece of infor-
mation in the sample that may be very useful in understanding the control arrangement
is the line of business the joint venture is in. We assign a two-digit Standard Industrial
Classiﬁcation (SIC) code and a two-digit Chinese Industrial Classiﬁcation code to each
of the 200 joint ventures in our sample based on the line of business it is in.15 According
to the Chinese Industrial Classiﬁcation, there are 101 joint ventures in 17 two-digit ser-
vices industries and 99 joint ventures in 22 two-digit manufacturing industries. Given
the large number of industries involved in the sample and relative small size, 200, of the
sample, it is not feasible to include industry-speciﬁce ﬀects in the estimates. In fact, we
want to understand why control arrangements vary across industries. For these reasons,
14Equal weighting is assumed for various tasks in a joint venture.
15There are some substantial diﬀerences between the Chinese industrial classiﬁcation and the Stan-
dard Industrial Classiﬁcation.
36we consider a few industry characteristicst h a tw et h i n ka r ei m p o r t a n tf o rd e t e r m i n -
ing the control arrangement. These industry level explanatory variables are not readily
available from one source. Given the poor data availability in China, a great deal of
eﬀort was made to acquire and/or construct them.
Variable FTASK introduced above is one measure of the level of contribution the
foreign partner makes to the joint venture. However, this measure is incomplete; it is
simply the unweighted count of the number of tasks performed by the foreign partner
without any regard given to the intensity of each task. Fortunately, this incomplete
measure can be supplemented due to the following observation: International joint ven-
tures in China are really a marriage between foreign technologies and Chinese markets.
Therefore, the importance of marketing is a measure of the domestic partner’s contri-
bution and the degree of technological sophistication is another indicator of the foreign
partner’s contribution. We use the industry average advertising expenditure relative to
net sales, denoted by AAD,a sap r o x yf o rt h ei m p o r t a n c eo fm a r k e t i n gi nt h ei n d u s t r y
and the industry-average R&D expenditure relative to net sales, denoted by ARD,a sa
proxy for the technological sophistication of the industry.16 The information needed to
compute AAD and ARD is taken from Worldscope a n dr e f e r st o1 9 9 3o rt ot h ec l o s e s t
year for which the information is available.17 Our discussion here and that proceeding
Hypotheses 3 and 4 lead us to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 5: The degree of control by the foreign partner increases with the R&D
intensity of the industry.
Hypothesis 6: The equity share to the foreign partner increases with the R&D intensity
of the industry.
Hypothesis 7: The degree of control by the foreign partner decreases with advertising
expenditure of the industry.
16We thank Beata K. Smarzynska at the World Bank for generously providing us data on AAD and
ARD (Smarzynska, 2000). We also thank Shang-Jin Wei of the IMF and the Brookings Institution for
bringing the data to our attention.
17Worldscope is a commercial database that provides detailed ﬁnancial statements, business descrip-
tions, and historical pricing information on thousands of public companies located in more than ﬁfty
countries.
37Hypothesis 8: The equity share to the foreign partner decreases with advertising ex-
penditure of the industry.
Two other industry characteristics we consider are the capital intensity of, and mar-
ket power in, the industry. We use the industry-average capital-labor ratio, denoted by
KL, as a proxy for capital intensity. Regarding market power in individual industries,
we do not have the ideal measure of industry concentration indices, but we believe the
overall proﬁtability of the industry provides a good proxy. For this purpose, we consider
the industry-average markup ratio, deﬁned as the ratio of industry aggregate proﬁt/loss
with respect to industry aggregate sales and denoted by MARKUP.W ec o n s t r u c tKL
and MARKUP from Chinese statistics. China had its ﬁrst census of the service indus-
tries in 1993, from which we obtained the industry-aggregate capital, labor, proﬁt/loss,
and sales for year 1992. For the Chinese manufacturing industries, there has been an
annual statistical yearbook since 1985. We used only the 1992 data for the purpose of
consistency. Markup ratios and capital labor ratios thus calculated are then assigned
to all joint ventures in the sample. It can be argued that when a joint venture does
not face much competition and hence is very proﬁtable, there is a large scope for the
controlling shareholder to expropriate without being constrained by the concern for the
ﬁrm’s survival. As a result, the minority shareholder demands more protection, possibly
through joint control. Then, we have:
Hypothesis 9: The degree of joint control increases with the markup ratio.
The eﬀect of capital intensity on the control arrangement is more complicated, similar
to the eﬀect of investment size.
The decision in our model can be any one of the 15 decisions we observe in the
sample of contracts. Our model predicts that the optimal control arrangement for each
decision depends on the relative strength of the expropriation and the Pareto-improving
action. Unfortunately, we don’t have information about how the relative strength varies
across the decisions. We also believe that any ad hoc speculation about it is unsatis-
factory. Therefore, we cannot test our prediction about the heterogeneity of the control
arrangement across decisions directly. It might be useful to ﬁnd out whether the factors
we considered in this subsection have diﬀerent eﬀects on the control arrangement of
diﬀerent decisions, which we will do in Section 6.4.
386.2 Hypotheses under Cooperative Investment
The hypotheses developed in the preceding subsection are for the case of self invest-
ment. In this subsection, we examine the relevance of these hypotheses for the case of
cooperative investment with eﬃcient bargaining. Our objective is to empirically dif-
ferentiate between the two types of investment based on our sample of joint venture
contracts. Therefore we focus solely on those hypotheses that will no longer hold under
the assumptions of cooperative investment and eﬃcient bargaining.
Recall that our model predicts very diﬀerent results for cooperative investment than
for self investment. The main reason is that ex post renegotiation increases incentives
for cooperative investment but decreases those for self investment. Speciﬁcally, under
unilateral control, the potential of expropriation increases the needs for ex post rene-
gotiation and therefore increases incentives for cooperative investment. Therefore, the
potential of expropriation increases the desirability of unilateral control relative to joint
control. This argument implies that, with cooperative investment, Hypotheses 1, 2, and
9 in the last subsection about joint control should all be reversed; that is, the degree of
joint control should increase over time and decrease with the markup ratio, and there
should be more joint control when the foreign partner is from a similar cultural back-
ground as the domestic partner than otherwise. Thus, empirical testing of Hypotheses
1, 2 and 9 (see Section 6.4 below) should allow us to infer whether the assumption of
self-investment is more relevant for our sample of joint venture contracts than that of
cooperative investment.
6.3 Hypotheses for the Case of No Ex Ante Investment
In Section 5.3, we analyzed the case of no ex ante investment, as is assumed by the
Transaction Cost Economics view of organization. There, we found that the basic trade-
oﬀs between joint control and unilateral control that we discussed in Section 4 were still
valid. Therefore, we expect that Hypotheses 1, 2 and 9 remain to hold even in the
absence of ex ante investment. Hypotheses 3 - 8, however, are concerned with the
relative importance of the partners’ eﬀorts and its implications for control right and
39revenue sharing arrangements. A model without ex ante investment such as the one
in Section 5.3 is silent on these implications. To the extent that there is empirical
support for Hypotheses 3 - 8, it would suggest that our model with ex ante investment
is more relevant for our sample of joint venture contracts than the model without ex
ante investment.
6.4 Econometric Analysis
In this subsection, we estimate some econometric models about the control right and
the revenue share to test the hypotheses discussed in Sections 6.1 - 6.3. Although
the control right and the revenue share aﬀect each other, both are determined by the
exogenous variables in the end. We therefore examine how the control right and the
revenue share are determined by the exogenous variables, i.e., estimating the reduced
form equations of the control right and the revenue share.
Determinants of joint control
We perform a stepwise backward-selection search for regression model of JC on
the independent variables, AAD, ARD, F_CHN, FTASK, INV, KL, MARKUP,a n d
YEAR. OLS (Ordinary least square) regression of JC against all independent variables
is performed. Then, the independent variable with the highest p value is eliminated and
the regression of JC against the rest of the variables is carried out. The above process
is repeated until all the remaining variables are signiﬁcant at the 10% level (see Table
5 for details). Note that the coeﬃcients of all the independent variables maintain the
same signs throughout the regressions, implying that our ﬁnding is robust with respect
to various model speciﬁcations.
Regression # 6 of Table 5 should be highlighted as the adjusted R2 is the high-
est among all the regressions performed and all the independent variables involved are
signiﬁcant at the 10% level (p value is shown in the parenthesis).
JC =6 3 2 .54 +6.64MARKUP −0.31YEA R −1.59F_CHN
(0.071) (0.086) (0.075) (0.014)
40There are three variables signiﬁcantly aﬀecting the degree of joint control: (1) YEAR is
negative at 7.5% level, (2) F_CHN is negative at 1.4%, and (3) MARKUP is positive
at 8.6% level. These ﬁndings provide strong empirical support to our Hypotheses 1, 2,
and 9.
Determinants of foreign control
Joint control is just one of the three possible control arrangements for any decision
in a joint venture. The measure of foreign control in a joint venture, namely, FC,i s
more comprehensive, and is the subject of analysis in the next few paragraphs. Stepwise
backward-selection search for FC is carried out similar to that for JC, and the results
are summarized in Table 6.
Regression #2 of Table 6 has the highest adjusted R2.
FC = −654.98 −1.97F_CHN +0.92FTASK −0.05AAD
(0.277) (0.075) (0.006) (0.054)
+0.04ARD −0.008INV +0.34YEA R +0.001KL
(0.109) (0.170) (0.257) (0.667)
Four variables signiﬁcantly aﬀect the degree of foreign control in a joint venture: (1)
FTASK is positive at 0.6% level, (2) AAD is negative at 5.4% level, (3) ARD is positive
at 10.9% level, and (4) F_CHN is negative at 7.5% level.
The results about FTASK, AAD,a n dARD oﬀer strong empirical support to Hy-
potheses 3, 5, and 7. The result about F_CHN is unexpected. It says that the degree of
foreign control is lower when the foreign partner is from Hong Kong, Macau, Singapore,
or Taiwan. We have argued earlier that expropriation is less of a problem when the
t w oj o i n tv e n t u r ep a r t n e r ss h a r et h es a m ec ultural background and therefore there is
less need for joint control than otherwise. This argument is supported by the earlier
empirical ﬁnding. When there is less joint control, there should be more unilateral con-
trol, by either the foreign partner or the domestic partner.18 T h er e s u l th e r es a y st h a t ,
when the foreign partner is from Hong Kong, Macau, Singapore, or Taiwan, there is less
18Note that, according to our deﬁnition of the index FC and the corresponding deﬁnition of the index
for domestic control, call it DC, FC and DC add up to a constant and cannot both increase at the
same time.
41foreign control and consequently more domestic control. One possible reason for this
result is that the mitigation of the expropriation problem by the shared cultural back-
ground between the joint venture partners implies that the main issue behind the control
arrangement is to ensure eﬀective response to market conditions in the least costly way.
T h ec o s tf o rt h ed o m e s t i cp a r t n e rt oh a n d l ef r e q u e n td e c i s i o nm a k i n gi sp r o b a b l yl o w e r
than that for the foreign partner. If so, then the domestic partner should be given
unilateral control.
Determinants of foreign equity share
Similar to the degree of foreign control, foreign equity share, FESHARE,i sa l s o
determined by the exogenous variables. The results of stepwise backward-selection search
for FESHARE are summarized in Table 7. Regression #6 in Table 7 has the highest
adjusted R2.
FESHARE =4 9 .95 −0.16AAD +0.15ARD +0.98FTASK
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.160)
Two variables are statistically signiﬁcant determinants of foreign equity share. (1) AAD
is negative at 0.2% level, and (2) ARD is positive at 0.2% level. At 16% level, FTASK
is barely insigniﬁcant but it is positive. All these results support Hypotheses 4, 6, and
8, albeit weakly so in the case of Hypothesis 4.
Control arrangements for individual decisions
We next examine the control arrangements for individual decisions to see whether
there is heterogeneity among them. Stepwise backward-selection search is carried out for
the degree of foreign control in decisions # 5, ..., # 15 (namely, FCi where i =5 ,...,15),19
and the results for regressions of the highest adjusted R2 are summarized in Table 8. As
i nt h ec a s ef o rt h ed e g r e eo ff o r e i g nc o n t r o li naj o i n tv e n t u r e ,FTASK, ARD, AAD,a n d
F_CHN are among the variables that signiﬁcantly aﬀect the degree of foreign control
in various decisions; and their signs are the same as in Regression # 2 of Table 6, which
19The ﬁrst four decisions are not examined as, for them, joint control is almost universially adopted
and there is little variation in control arrangement.
42have been explained earlier. However, FTASK is the only variable signiﬁcantly aﬀecting
the degree of foreign control in all d e c i s i o n s . I ti si m p o r t a n tt on o t et h a td i ﬀerent
sets of variables aﬀect the degree of foreign control in diﬀerent decisions. Particularly,
for decisions #12 (hiring and ﬁring of CEO and other senior management staﬀ)a n d
#15 (making other decisions deemed to be important by the board), there is a new
statistically signiﬁcant variable, INV.
The negative sign of INV implies that the Chinese partner demands more control
in these two decisions when the size of investment is large. We discussed in Section 6.1
that there are two countervailing eﬀects of INV in foreign control. Our ﬁnding here
suggests that the second eﬀect dominates the ﬁr s to n e ;t h a ti s ,t h ep o s i t i v ee ﬀect of INV
on FC is a result of the industrial policy in China. To provide more evidence for this
conclusion, we examine the twenty joint ventures with the largest size of investment in
our sample. It turns out that fourteen of the twenty are in four industries: electricity,
automobile, raw chemical materials, and metal products, which are considered strategic
industries in China. Government policy discourages foreign control of ﬁrms in these
industries. Indeed, only two of the fourteen joint ventures give majority equity share
to the foreign partner, and one of the two splits the voting share equally between the
foreign and domestic partners despite of the majority equity share to the foreign partner.
For each of decisions #5, ..., #15, we also analyze the determinants of whether the
decision is under joint control or not. We do this by performing a stepwise backward-
selection search for the logit models. Since adjusted R2 is no longer meaningful, we
replace it with the signiﬁcance level of the chi-squared test. The result is summarized
in Table 9. The probit analysis yields almost identical results; to avoid repetition, we
do not show the results here. As in the analysis of the degree of joint control in a joint
venture, F_CHN, MARKUP,a n dYEAR are among the variables that signiﬁcantly
aﬀect whether we have joint control in various decisions; and their signs are the same as
in Regression # 6 of Table 5, which have been explained earlier. However, no variable
signiﬁcantly aﬀects joint control for all decisions. Diﬀerent sets of variables aﬀect joint
control in diﬀerent decisions.
436.5 Implications of the empirical ﬁndings on theories
Our empirical ﬁndings above oﬀer strong support to our theoretical model with self
investment and reject the model with cooperative investment. The theoretical model
without ex ante investment is consistent with the empirical ﬁndings about the determi-
nants of the degree of joint control, but it does not oﬀer any explanation to the ﬁndings
about how the relative importance of the partners’ contribution aﬀects control right and
revenue sharing arrangements. We believe that this indicates our Property Rights Theo-
retical model with self investment is more relevant than the Transaction Cost Economics
based model in the context of this paper.
We don’t know of any other theoretical model in the existing literature that is con-
sistent with all of our empirical ﬁndings. Some existing theories can be viewed as partial
models of joint ventures, by focusing on either the revenue sharing contract or the control
arrangement. Our empirical results can also shed light on some of these theories.
Our ﬁndings oﬀer support to the moral hazard models of team production (Holm-
strom, 1982). Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd support to the assumption of complementary roles
played by the partners. We also ﬁnd evidence that the more important contributor to
t h et e a mi sg i v e nm o r er e v e n u es h a r e .
The optimality of unilateral control (or ownership) predicted by some basic GHM
models is not supported by the evidence in the context of joint ventures. However, our
model builds on the GHM incomplete contract framework. Our ﬁn d i n g sh e r ep r o v et h e
usefulness of that framework.
Some variations of the basic GHM model also predict joint control (or joint owner-
ship). One example is the models by Chiu (1998) and De Meza and Lookwood (1998).
They replace the Nash bargaining game in GHM by the strategic bargaining game and
show that ownership may weaken one’s investment incentive. An implication of their
argument is that the party with more contribution should be given less control rights,
which is inconsistent with our empirical ﬁndings. Another example is Cai (1999). He
argues that, under unilateral ownership, the owner overinvests in general capital and un-
derinvests in speciﬁc capital to improve his disagreement payoﬀ in ex post bargaining.20
20A similar idea is alluded to in Rajan and Zingales (1998) when studying the optimal allocation of
access in an organization.
44An implication of this argument is that the party whose speciﬁc investment is more
important should be given less control, which is also inconsistent with our empirical
ﬁndings.21
There are some recent papers speciﬁcally on the topic of joint venture (Minehart and
Neeman, 1999; Noldeke and Schmidt, 1998), the empirical relevance of which is worth
discussing. Minehart and Neeman (1999) focus on two problems in joint ventures. One
is the moral hazard problem of eﬀort coordination: inducing one (subordinating) partner
to adopt the agenda favored by the dominant partner. The other problem is to facilitate
eﬃcient dissolution of the joint venture: buyout of the joint venture by the high-valuing
partner of the low-valuing partner, in an environment where each partner’s value of the
joint venture is his private information. They examine contractual arrangements to solve
these two problems, and hence there is no role for control arrangements in their model.
In addition, the revenue share in their model plays two roles in diﬀerent directions: the
subordinating partner should be given more share for eﬀo r tc o o r d i n a t i o n ,b u th es h o u l d
be given less share to ensure the eﬃcient dissolution of the joint venture. Hence there
is no clear prediction on the relationship between a partner’s eﬀort importance and his
revenue share. We, however, ﬁnd in our testing of Hypotheses 4, 6, and 8 that the foreign
partner’s equity share increases in the importance of his eﬀort as measured by FTASK
and ARD but decreases in the importance of the Chinese partner’s eﬀort as proxied by
AAD.
Noldeke and Schmidt (1998) extend the GHM framework by considering a holdup
problem in which the two trading partners make relationship-speciﬁc investments se-
quentially. As in GHM, they focus exclusively on control arrangements as the solution
to the holdup problem and there is no role for revenue-sharing contracts in their model.
The optimal ownership structure they derive is a contingent ownership structure, which
involves one partner having unilateral ownership of the ﬁrm initially and the other part-
ner having the option of acquiring the unilateral ownership of the ﬁrm at a set price at
a later date; at each point in time, there is only unilateral control by either partner. In
our empirical study, however, not only do we ﬁnd revenue sharing contracts but also the
prevalence of joint control for various decisions in the joint venture.
21The tasks the partners are assigned to in the joint venture contract are mostly ﬁrm speciﬁc.
457C o n c l u s i o n
This paper presents a theoretical model that is grounded in the stylized facts we found
from a sample of 200 joint venture contracts and uses econometric analysis of the revenue
sharing and control arrangements in these joint ventures to test the model, identify the
right assumption for the model, and shed light on the empirical relevance of some existing
theories of the ﬁrm, including the Property Rights Theory, the Transaction Cost Theory,
and the moral hazard model of team production.
The stylized facts that motivated our model include: First, the partners in a joint
venture are assigned diﬀerent tasks. Second, both revenue-sharing and control arrange-
ments ﬁgure prominently in the joint venture contracts. Third, control arrangements are
made for a number of issues in each joint venture; some issues are under joint control by
both partners and others are under unilateral control by one partner. Finally, revenue
sharing and control arrangements vary across ﬁrms.
Our model incorporates the revenue-sharing contract into the incomplete contract
frameworks of Grossman-Hart-Moore Property Rights Theory and the Transaction Cost
Theory of the ﬁrm. Furthermore, we allow the controlling partner(s)’ ex post decision
to be value redistributing (expropriation) or Pareto improving. The predictions of the
model depend on whether we assume self investment or cooperative investment, on the
assumption about the ex post bargaining eﬃciency, and last but not the least, on whether
we consider ex ante investment incentives.
We ﬁrst adopt the Property Rights Theory approach and consider the case where ex
ante investment incentives are important. With self investment, the ex post ineﬃcient
decisions themselves in the absence of renegotiation, or the ex post renegotiation that
results from the threat of ineﬃcient decisions, are harmful to ex ante investment incen-
tives. We show that joint control is optimal if the value-redistributing action dominates
the Pareto-improving action. In the opposite case where unilateral control is optimal,
the value-redistributing action may be avoided even without renegotiation if the control-
ling partner is given large revenue share. In this case, control right and revenue share
should be complements. Furthermore, the partner with more important contribution
should be given more control and revenue share.
With cooperative investment and eﬃcient bargaining, ex post renegotiation is bene-
46ﬁcial to ex ante investment incentives. Then, unilateral control is optimal if the value-
redistributing action dominates the Pareto-improving action. Furthermore, control right
and revenue share are substitutes. The relationship between the importance of a part-
ner’s contribution and his revenue share or control right is ambiguous. Under cooperative
investment without bargaining, ex post ineﬃcient decisions cannot be bargained away
and the eﬀects of various ineﬃcient decisions are similar to those under self investment.
However, for joint control to be optimal in this case, the controller under unilateral con-
trol has to ﬁnd it in his interest to take the value-redistributing action, which requires
the negative eﬀect of the action on the veriﬁa b l er e v e n u et ob es m a l l ,a n dt h ed a m a g e
of the action has to be large, which in this case requires the negative eﬀect of the action
on the veriﬁable revenue to be large. These contradicting requirements imply that joint
control is not common in this case.
We then adopt the Transaction Cost Theory approach and consider the case where
ex ante investment incentives can be ignored. If a partner with unilateral control can be
induced not to expropriate when given suﬃcient revenue share, then unilateral control by
the partner is optimal. In this case, control and revenue share are complements. If it is
impossible to induce the controlling partner to refrain from expropriation, then the opti-
mal control arrangement depends on the relative importance of the value-redistributing
action and the Pareto-improving action. These results are similar to those under the
assumption of self investment. However, the Transaction Cost Theory approach does
not readily yield predictions on the relationship between the importance of a partner’s
eﬀort and his control right and revenue share.
Our econometric analysis shows that the degree of joint control decreases over time as
the legal environment improves, with the cultural aﬃnity between the joint venture part-
ners, and with the competitiveness of the industry the joint venture is in. These ﬁndings
suggests that the degree of joint control increases with the severity of the expropriation
problem. We also ﬁnd that the foreign partner’s control right and revenue share increase
with the number of tasks he is assigned in the contract and the technological sophisti-
cation of the industry, but decrease with the need for marketing in the industry. This
supports the conclusion that the partner with more important contribution should be
given more control and revenue share. Together with the descriptive stylized facts, these
econometric ﬁndings oﬀer strong support to our model with self investment and reject
47the model with cooperative investment. In comparison, the Transaction-Cost-Theory
based model receives weaker support because it leaves some of the empirical ﬁndings
unexplained. Within the Property-Rights-Theory framework, our empirical ﬁndings re-
ject some of the existing extensions to the GHM model that yields the optimality of
joint ownership. Finally, our model attains the highest degree of consistency with the
empirical ﬁndings among existing models of the joint venture.
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1 c
2 cCountry/Area Number
Japan 31
1 156 U.S. 39
2 29 Hong  Kong 94
3 13 Macau 1
4 1 Korea 5
10 1 Taiwan 15
Panama 1
Singapore 10
U.K. 7
Germany 7
British Virgin Island 2
Norway 1
Bermuda 2
Canada 6
Denmark 1
Russia 2
1 172 Malaysia 2
2 23 Thailand 4
3 3 Switzerland 4
4 1 Western Samoa 1
6 1 France 2
Number of Foreign Partners Number of JVs
Table 1a: The Number of Chinese Partners in a 
Joint Venture
Table 2a: Country of Origin of Foreign Partners
Number of Chinese Partners Number of JVs
Table 1b: The Number of Foreign Partners in a 
Joint VentureProvince Number Location Number of JVs
Beijing 122 Beijing 97
Tianjin 5 Tianjin 3
Hebei 2 Hebei 3
Shanxi 2 Shanxi 2
Inner Mongolia 2 Inner Mongolia 1
Liaoning 10 Liaoning 8
Jilin 5 Jilin 4
Heilongjiang 5 Heilongjiang 4
Shanghai 26 Shanghai 15
Jiangsu 21 Jiangsu 11
Zhejiang 7 Zhejiang 6
Anhui 2 Anhui 2
Fujian 7F u jian 6
Jiangxi 0 Jiangxi 0
Shandong 5 Shandong 4
Henan 8 Henan 5
Hubei 4 Hubei 3
Hunan 2 Hunan 2
Guangdong 21 Guangdong 14
Guangxi 3 Guangxi 3
Sichuan 4 Sichuan 4
Guizhou 0 Guizhou 0
Yunnan 0 Yunnan 0
Tibet 0 Tibet 0
Shannxi 2 Shannxi 1
Gansu 1 Gansu 1
Qinghai 0 Qinghai 0
Ningxia 0 Ningxia 0
Xinjiang 1 Xinjiang 1
Table 2c: Location of JVs Table 2b: Regional Origin of Chinese PartnersOne-Digit 
SIC Code
Title Number 
of JVs
AA griculture, Forestry, and Fishing 0
B Mining 0
C Construction 4
D Manufacturing 93
E Transportation and Public Utilities 33
F Wholesale Trade 3
G Retail Trade 5
H Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 7
I Services 55
J Public Administration 0
K Nonclassifiable Establishments 0
20 Food and Kindred Products 17
21 Tobacco Products 0
22 Textile Mill Products 1
23 Apparel and Other Textile Products 5
24 Lumber and Wood Products 1
25 Furniture and Fixtures 1
26 Paper and Allied Products 1
27 Printing and Publishing 2
28 Chemicals and Allied Products 10
29 Petroleum and Coal Porducts 0
30 Rubber and Misc. Plastics Products 7
31 Leather and Leather Products 2
32 Stone, Clay, and Glass Products 3
33 Primary Metal Industries 4
34 Fabricated Metal Products 6
35 Industrial Machinery and Equipment 4
36 Electronic & Other Electric Equipment 8
37 Transportation Equipment 11
38 Instruments and Related Products 10
39 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries 3
Table 3a: Industry Distribution of Joint Ventures
 (SIC Code)
Two-Digit 
SIC Code
Title Number 
of JVs
Table 3b: Joint Ventures in the Manufacturing Industries 
(SIC Code)Two-Digit 
SIC Code
Number 
of JVs
70 0
72 Personal Services 2
73 Business Services 9
75 Auto Repair Services, and Parking 1
76 Miscellaneous Repair Services 1
78 Motion Pictures 1
79 Amusement & Recreation 0
80 Health Services 10
81 Legal Services 0
82 Educational Services 0
83 Social Services 0
84 Musems, Botanical, Zoological Gardens 0
86 Membership Organizations 0
87 Engineering & Manuagement Services 31
88 Private Households 0
89 Services, Nec 0
Minority 50-50 Majority Total
Minority 70 8 8 86
50-50 5 28 11 44
Majority 2 7 61 70
Total 77 43 80 200
Table 3c: Joint Ventures in the Service Industries 
(SIC Code)
Table 4: Relationship Between Equity Share and 
Representation on the Boare of Directors
Foreign Equity Share
Foreign 
Voting 
Share
Title
Hotels and Other Lodging PlacesExplanatory
Variables
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5 Regression 6
Constant 582.5676 594.3608* 597.7425* 602.6401* 614.713* 632.5431*
(355.2417) (353.5701) (352.6433) (351.3838) (349.1293) (348.6559)
(0.103) (0.094) (0.092) (0.088) (0.080) (0.071)
MARKUP 10.22837 7.986149* 7.23533* 7.624829* 7.755243* 6.643384*
(6.828568) (4.751401) (4.268198) (4.035331) (4.01139) (3.85196)
(0.136) (0.094) (0.092) (0.060) (0.055) (0.086)
YEAR -0.2882487 -0.2941019* -0.295772* -0.2983522* -0.3044334* -0.3128939*
(0.17824) (0.1774114) (0.1769482) (0.1762949) (0.1751579) (0.1749448)
(0.108) (0.099) (0.096) (0.092) (0.084) (0.075)
F_CHN -1.647943** -1.643656** -1.639142** -1.61516** -1.610247** -1.588301**
(0.6557132) (0.6542817) (0.6526752) (0.6457147) (0.6441436) (0.6437429)
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
FTASK 0.2060104 0.2026575 0.2017258 0.1929082 0.1920409
(0.1976676) (0.1971209) (0.1966557) (0.1937581) (0.1933126)
(0.299) (0.305) (0.306) (0.321) (0.322)
INV -0.0016414 -0.0015224 -0.0014587 -0.0013093
(0.0035643) (0.0035474) (0.003535) (0.0034878)
(0.646) (0.668) (0.680) (0.708)
AAD -0.0100028 -0.0064958 -0.0017305
(0.0163855) (0.0144569) (0.0060516)
(0.542) (0.654) (0.775)
ARD 0.0093293 0.0054613
(0.0172752) (0.0150394)
(0.590) (0.717)
KL -0.0008925
(0.0019484)
(0.647)
R
2 0.0558 0.0547 0.0541 0.0537 0.053 0.0481
Adjusted R
2 0.0158 0.0199 0.0244 0.0290 0.0334 0.0334
Table 5: Regression Results on Joint Control in Joint Ventures
Dependent Variable: JCj; Method: OLS
Note: For each explanatory variable in a regression, the estimate of its coefficient, the standard error and P-
value are listed, with the latter two in brackets. ***,**, and * denote significant levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. Explanatory 
Variables Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5 Regression 6 Regression 7
Constant -655.4688 -654.98 -606.23 28.62724*** 28.2386*** 27.68969*** 26.63021***
(602.2185) (600.7696) (596.0846) (2.008933) (1.991175) (1.963724) (1.661883)
(0.278) (0.277) (0.310) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
F_CHN -1.939307* -1.973299* -1.718657 -1.820492* -1.735666 -1.808263* -1.618103
(1.111589) (1.103029) (1.094475) (1.090668) (1.090878) (1.093311) (1.077131)
(0.083) (0.075) (0.118) (0.097) (0.113) (0.100) (0.135)
FTASK 0.9036616*** 0.9197597*** 0.8781599*** 0.8543634*** 0.8347036** 0.8812523*** 0.8045553**
(0.3350932) (0.3298892) (0.3272592) (0.3266086) (0.3268984) (0.3264753) (0.3175883)
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.012)
AAD -0.0422182 -0.0463786* -0.0474214** -0.0457963* -0.0417538* -0.0098305
(0.0277774) (0.0239319) (0.0235256) (0.0234842) (0.0233295) (0.009708)
(0.130) (0.054) (0.045) (0.053) (0.075) (0.312)
ARD 0.0317551 0.0371068 0.0387693* 0.037155 0.0343463
(0.0292855) (0.023035) (0.022936) (0.0228938) (0.0228391)
(0.280) (0.109) (0.093) (0.106) (0.134)
INV -0.0083204 -0.0082974 -0.008468 -0.0078968
(0.0060423) (0.0060273) (0.0059893) (0.0059673)
(0.170) (0.170) (0.159) (0.187)
YEAR 0.3433393 0.3429016 0.3184915
(0.3021589) (0.3014294) (0.2990386)
(0.257) (0.257) (0.288)
KL 0.0016923 0.0009888
(0.003303) (0.0022975)
(0.609) (0.667)
MARKUP -3.4393
(11.57603)
(0.767)
R
2 0.0794 0.0789 0.0726 0.0672 0.0587 0.0478 0.0428
Adjusted R
2 0.0404 0.0450 0.0438 0.0431 0.0394 0.0332 0.0331
Table 6: Regression Results on Foreign Control in Joint Ventures
Dependent Variable: FCj; Method: OLS
Note: For each explanatory variable in a regression, the estimate of its coefficient, the standard error and P-value are 
listed, with the latter two in brackets. ***,**, and * denote significant levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Explanatory
Variables
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5 Regression 6 Regression 7
Constant -544.5971 -533.4328 -387.1778 -405.3262 -367.3615 49.95174*** 53.60437***
(1289.046) (1282.317) (1275.564) (1267.345) (1258.82) (3.893024) (2.914848)
(0.673) (0.678) (0.762) (0.749) (0.771) (0.000) (0.000)
AAD -0.1675445*** -0.1642245*** -0.1619191*** -0.1616578*** -0.1595199*** -0.1585969*** -0.157981***
(0.0594573) (0.0524319) (0.0503425) (0.0501897) (0.0496243) (0.0494335) (0.0495558)
(0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
ARD 0.160313** 0.1566512*** 0.1568302*** 0.1571773*** 0.1556112*** 0.1547494*** 0.16114***
(0.0626856) (0.0545446) (0.0490808) (0.0489098) (0.04855) (0.0483701) (0.0482785)
(0.011) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
FTASK 1.069333 1.066159 1.006478 1.003898 0.9927216 0.9774493
(0.7172656) (0.714912) (0.7003032) (0.6983583) (0.6958681) (0.6927631)
(0.138) (0.138) (0.152) (0.152) (0.155) (0.160)
YEAR 0.2985172 0.2929762 0.2195334 0.2285035 0.2093711
(0.6467698) (0.6434302) (0.6399138) (0.6358645) (0.6315625)
(0.645) (0.649) (0.732) (0.720) (0.741)
INV -0.0043789 -0.0042664 -0.0041717 -0.0040679
(0.0129335) (0.0128656) (0.0128166) (0.012768)
(0.735) (0.741) (0.745) (0.750)
F_CHN -0.8612431 -0.8571852 -0.3757966
(2.379351) (2.372929) (2.342071)
(0.718) (0.718) (0.873)
MARKUP 3.617971 1.495338
(24.77845) (17.23224)
(0.884) (0.931)
KL -0.0008449
(0.00707)
(0.905)
R
2 0.0661 0.0660 0.0646 0.0645 0.0640 0.0635 0.540
Adjusted R
2 0.0266 0.0316 0.0356 0.0404 0.0448 0.0492 0.444
Note: For each explanatory variable in a regression, the estimate of its coefficient, the standard error and P-value are 
listed, with the latter two in brackets. ***,**, and * denote significant levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Table 7: Regression Results on Foreign Equity Share in Joint Ventures
Dependent Variable: FESHARE; Method: OLSExplanatory 
Variables D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 D11 D12 D13 D14 D15
Constant -61.92949 1.900959*** -64.64258 -91.53029 1.762564*** -61.94893 1.841467*** 2.158611*** -61.16577 -64.49815 -58.50733
(54.29034) (0.1708591) (54.74815) (61.91186) (0.2278607) (63.45781) (0.1889764) (0.1865165) (58.26075) (64.08108) (55.62829)
FTASK 0.0940528*** 0.0625393** 0.0799389*** 0.0801817** 0.08479** 0.0898578** 0.0890449*** 0.0476022* 0.0912778*** 0.0926351*** 0.0998702***
(0.0298062) (0.0271203) (0.0301684) (0.0345168) (0.0370452) (0.0353787) (0.0310249) (0.0257577) (0.031986) (0.0351876) (0.0305407)
AAD -0.0033134 -0.0009116 -0.0044519** -0.0038687 -0.0054679** -0.0043855* -0.0036649* -0.0015342* -0.0065989*** -0.0050792** -0.0048493**
(0.0021427) (0.0008279) (0.0021681) (0.0025315) (0.0026637) (0.0025947) (0.0022141) (0.0007929) (0.0022994) (0.0025527) (0.0021955)
ARD 0.0020961 0.0038113* 0.0032521 0.0053479** 0.003752 0.0026815 -0.0058195*** 0.0045073* 0.0035824*
(0.002089) (0.0021129) (0.0026335) (0.0025967) (0.0026992) (0.0021676) (0.0022417) (0.002457) (0.0021405)
F_CHN -0.1042152 -0.1808029** -0.1934101* -0.1274385 -0.1956292* -0.2310587** -0.1756317** -0.1559221 -0.1726288 -0.2107767**
(0.0996828) (0.0908358) (0.1145679) (0.1237076) (0.1174287) (0.1035319) (0.085293) (0.1069729) (0.1176545) (0.1021395)
INV -0.0006257 -0.0006522 -0.0005989 -0.0009121 -0.0009011 -0.0008202 -0.0008427* -0.0009314 -0.000838 -0.0009387*
(0.0005455) (0.0004934) (0.0005516) (0.0006212) (0.0006768) (0.0006367) (0.0004615) (0.0005854) (0.0006429) (0.0005589)
KL 0.0002316 0.0001457
(0.0001884) (0.0002451)
MARKUP 0.2224594 -0.272393 -0.4844669
(0.8319936) (0.8527687) (0.5570038)
YEAR 0.0319821 0.0333257 0.0468592 0.0320087 0.0316324 0.0332425 0.0302862
(0.0272359) (0.0274688) (0.0310656) (0.0318413) (0.0292277) (0.032152) (0.0279071)
R
2 0.0694 0.0558 0.0604 0.0652 0.0610 0.0737 0.0737 0.0609 0.0951 0.0734 0.0986
Adjusted R
2 0.0405 0.0312 0.0362 0.0307 0.0368 0.0396 0.0547 0.0364 0.0669 0.0393 0.0706
Table 8: Regression Results on Foreign Control in Various Decisions
Dependent Variables: FCi; Method: OLS
Note: For each explanatory variable in a regression, the estimate of its coefficient and the standard error are listed, with the latter in brackets. ***,**, and * denote significant 
levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.Explanatory 
Variables D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 D11 D12 D13 D14 D15
Constant -0.0045489 0.616529 226.6701 -1.443721* 569.9205*** 271.9875* 2.79e-16 370.7493** 337.6971** 326.1328* -0.1709149
(0.2554916) (0.5364821) (162.8081) (0.5812046) (178.0344) (165.4269) (0.2108185) (187.9117) (164.6463) (169.2449) (0.2550754)
F_CHN -0.4811875 -0.4091617 -0.4432151 -1.010866*** -0.8640215*** -0.3302417 -0.582341** -1.130733*** -0.4799606
(0.2958098) (0.2996576) (0.2991781) (0.3177094) (0.310385) (0.286022) (0.2949991) (0.3210268) (0.2959092)
MARKUP 3.215511* 3.710171** 5.671563*** 3.356424* 3.850259** 2.999364*
(1.78931) (1.808953) (2.006222) (2.02725) (1.924066) (1.776575)
YEAR -0.113793 -0.2867384*** -0.136597* -0.1858871** -0.1694504** -0.1637398*
(0.0816914) (0.0893673) (0.0829984) (0.0942835) (0.0826043) (0.0849132)
FTASK 0.1109688 0.1999446**
(0.0889834) (0.0990693)
AAD -0.0036388
(0.002656)
ARD
INV
KL
Prob>Chi^2 0.0804 0.2437 0.0799 0.0006 0.0023 0.0075 0.2476 0.0177 0.0227 0.0005 0.0969
Table 9: Regression Results on Joint Control in Various Decisions
Dependent Variables: JCi; Method: Logit
Note: For each explanatory variable in a regression, the estimate of its coefficient and the standard error are listed, with the latter in brackets. ***,**, and * denote significant 
levels at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
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